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Abstract
In this thesis, we study the problem of computing approximate equilibria in sev-
eral classes of games. In particular, we study approximate Nash equilibria and
approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in polymatrix and bimatrix games
and approximate equilibria in Lipschitz games, penalty games and biased games.
We construct algorithms for computing approximate equilibria that beat the cur-
rent best algorithms for these problems.
In Chapter 3, we present a distributed method to compute approximate Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the
two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that
combines the two players’ payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent
LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff matrices, and then
computes an approximate Nash equilibrium using only limited communication
between the players.
In Chapter 4, we present an algorithm that, for every δ in the range 0 < δ ≤
0.5, finds a (0.5+δ)-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game in time polynomial in
the input size and 1
δ
. Note that our approximation guarantee does not depend on
the number of players, a property that was not previously known to be achievable
for polymatrix games, and still cannot be achieved for general strategic-form
games.
In Chapter 5, we present an approximation-preserving reduction from the
problem of computing an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium (-BNE) for a
two-player Bayesian game to the problem of computing an -NE of a polymatrix
game and thus show that the algorithm of Chapter 4 can be applied to two-player
Bayesian games. Furthermore, we provide a simple polynomial-time algorithm
for computing a 0.5-BNE.
In Chapter 5, we study games with non-linear utility functions for the players.
Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the utility function allows us to
provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games. We begin
by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all concave games
i
with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for
computing approximate equilibria in these games. Then we turn our attention
to penalty games, which encompass biased games and games in which players
take risk into account. Here we show that if the penalty function is Lipschitz
continuous, then we can provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme.
Finally, we study distance biased games, where we present simple strongly poly-
nomial time algorithms for finding best responses in L1, L
2
2, and L∞ biased games,
and then use these algorithms to provide strongly polynomial algorithms that find
2/3, 5/7, and 2/3 approximations for these norms, respectively.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, we study the problem of computing approximate equilibria in sev-
eral classes of games. In particular, we study approximate Nash equilibria and
approximate well supported Nash equilibria in polymatrix and bimatrix games
and approximate equilibria in Lipschitz games, penalty games and biased games.
We construct algorithms for computing approximate equilibria that beat the cur-
rent best algorithms that tackle these problems. In this chapter, we give an
overview of the problems we are considering, and the results that are obtained in
this thesis.
1.1 Game Theory
Game Theory is one of the most important mathematical fields established in the
20-th century. The seminal book, the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [69] is considered the text that
established the modern Game Theory. Since then, many books have been written
on Game Theory or use Game Theory as a tool. As Roger Myerson states in his
book [59]
“Game theory has a very general scope, encompassing questions that
are basic to all of the social sciences. It can offer insights into any
economic, political, or social situation that involves individuals who
have different goals or preferences.”
As the quote above states, Game Theory studies mathematical models where
two or more individuals, or players as they are called in the game theoretic lan-
guage, interact with each other. The details and the rules of the interactions
between the players are called games. A game can be described by the players
that participate, the set of available actions each player can choose from, known
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as strategies, and the utility every player gets from every possible outcome of the
game. The utility a player gets can be given implicitly by functions, or explicitly
by matrices if this is possible.
For example, Figure 1.1 demonstrates probably the most famous game; the
Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game there are two play-
ers, player I and player II, accused of committing a crime. Each player has two
choices:
1. denying the commitment of the crime, or “Quiet”,
2. confessing that the other player committed the crime, or “Fink”.
If both players deny the commitment of the crime, i.e. choose “Quiet”, then each
one of them will stay in prison for a year. If only one player chooses “Quiet” while
the other player “Fink”, then the player who choose “Quiet” will be sentenced
for five years whereas the other player will be set free. Finally, if both players
choose “Fink”, then each one of them will stay in prison for three years. The
utilities of the players for this game can be given by two 2 × 2 matrices or by
one table, Figure 1.1, that combines them. The interpretation of Figure 1.1 is
the following. Each cell corresponds to a possible outcome of the game and the
numbers correspond to the utility of the players for this outcome. The number in
the bottom-left corner of the cell corresponds to the utility of the player I, usually
called as the row player, while the number in the top-right corner corresponds to
the utility of the player II, usually called the column player.
In the game theoretic language the two-player games, that can be fully de-
scribed using two matrices, are known as bimatrix games.
@
@
I
II
Quiet
Fink
Quiet Fink
−1 −5
−1 0
0 −3
−5 −3
Figure 1.1: The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.
So, how can we study the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game? The objective is to
study the behavior of the players and argue about the outcome from their inter-
action. The major assumption in game theory is that the players are rational.
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This means that each player chooses the strategy that maximizes his utility given
the chosen action of his opponent. In game theoretic terms the players are util-
ity maximizers. Thus, if player I chooses Quiet, then player II should choose
Fink. This is because given that player I chooses Quiet, player II gets utility −1
by choosing Quiet, whereas if he chooses Fink he gets utility 0. If the player I
chooses Fink, then player II gets utility −5 if he chooses Quiet and utility −3 if
he chooses Fink. Hence, under the assumption that both players are rational, the
player II will choose Fink. By symmetry, for the player I we can conclude that
the only stable pair of choices is when both players choose Fink and get utility −3
each. Neither player can increase their utility by changing strategy. We call this
pair of actions a pure Nash equilibrium of the game 1. In a pure equilibrium the
strategy for every player involves only one action from the actions available to
him. Intuitively, a collection of strategies is a pure Nash equilibrium for a game
if no player can increase their utility by unilaterally deviating from his chosen
strategy, given that the rest of the players do not change their strategies. Notice
though that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game the players could cooperate and
both choose Quiet and get utility -1, but this violates the assumption of ratio-
nality for the players.
The notion of pure Nash equilibrium is easy to understand and in bimatrix
games is easy to find. Note although that in other more complicated games like
hedonic games is hard to find [35]. However, pure Nash equilibria do not exist in
every game. Consider for example the Penalty Shot game described in Figure 1.2
played between a goalkeeper, player G and a kicker, player K.
@
@G
K
L
R
L R
−1 1
1 −1
1 −1
−1 1
Figure 1.2: The Penalty Shot Game.
The numerical values correspond to the following rules: if the goalkeeper and
the penalty kicker choose the same side (Left or Right) then the goalkeeper wins
1Actually, this pair of actions is a dominant strategy profile, since every player has to choose
the specified action irrespectively from the action his opponent chooses
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one point and the penalty kicker loses one; if they choose different strategies, then
the goalkeeper loses a point and the penalty kicker wins one point. Note that for
each pair of pure strategies for the players the sum of their utilities adds up to
zero. These games are called zero sum games.
It is easy to see that there is no pure Nash equilibrium in the Penalty Shot
Game. So, what should be the outcome of a game that does not possess a pure
Nash equilibrium? Then, the players can randomize by selecting a probability
distribution over the set of their strategies and play mixed strategies. Suppose that
each player chooses Left with probability 1
2
and Right with probability 1
2
, i.e. the
players play uniformly at random their pure strategies, and communicate that to
their opponent. Then, no player can increase their expected utility by switching to
a different strategy (mixed or pure). The pair of uniform strategies of the players
is called mixed Nash equilibrium, or simply Nash equilibrium. Formally, the Nash
equilibrium is defined as a collection of mixed strategies, one for every player of
the game, such that none of the players can improve their expected utility by
unilaterally changing their strategy.
1.2 Existence of Equilibria
Although in the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game and in the Penalty Shot Game it is
easy to decide whether a Nash equilibrium exists, for larger games it was not
clear whether a Nash equilibrium exists or not.
John von Neumann [68] extended the work of Emile Borel [6] and showed that
any bimatrix zero sum game possesses at least one mixed Nash equilibrium. Later
it was understood that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in zero sum games
is equivalent to Linear Programming duality [17] and thus it is computationally
easy to find a Nash equilibrium in such games using the ellipsoid algorithm of
Khachiyan [51], or the interior point method of Karmakar [50].
John Nash [60] in his seminal paper showed that every game, with finite num-
ber of players and finite number of strategies available to each player, possesses
a mixed Nash equilibrium, irrespective from the structure of the utilities for the
players. These games are known as strategic form games.
Rosen in his seminal work [62] considered a more general setting of games,
with respect to the utilities of the players and the strategies available to each
player, called concave games. There, the available actions for each player corre-
spond to vectors from a convex set, thus each player can have infinite number of
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strategies. The payoff of each player is specified by a function that satisfies the
following condition: if every other player’s strategy is fixed, then the payoff to a
player is a concave function over his strategy space. Rosen proved that concave
games always possess an equilibrium. A natural subclass of concave games, stud-
ied by Caragiannis, Kurokawa and Procaccia [10], is the class of biased games.
A biased game is defined by a strategic form game, a base strategy and a penalty
function. The players play the strategic form game as normal, but they all suffer
a penalty for deviating from their base strategy. This penalty can be a non-linear
function, such as the L22 norm.
1.3 Computation of Nash Equilibria
Although the existence of equilibria was understood, there were no efficient algo-
rithms for finding one. Nash’s proof was based on the Brouwer’s fixed point the-
orem and it was non constructive. This means that Nash’s proof did not provide
or imply an algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium. Since then, the quest
of an efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria has started. Lemke [55]
gave an algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games. This
algorithm was fast in practice but its complexity remained unknown until 2004
when Savani and von Stengel [65] showed that there exist games in which the
algorithm needs exponential time to compute a Nash equilibrium.
In 1994 Papadimitriou [61] defined the complexity class PPAD in order to cap-
ture the complexity of the equilibrium computation problem. This class captures
problems that can be reduced to the end of line problem:
• Given a succinctly represented directed graph consisting of vertices with
indegree and outderee at most one and a vertex of outdegree one, find a
vertex with zero outdegree.
Ten years later, a line of work of Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [18],
and Chen, Deng and Teng [12] showed that computing an exact Nash equilib-
rium is PPAD-complete even for bimatrix games, and so there are unlikely to be
polynomial time algorithms for this problem. The hardness of computing exact
Nash equilibria has lead to the study of approximate Nash equilibria: while an
exact equilibrium requires that all players have no incentive to deviate from their
current strategy, an -approximate Nash equilibrium, simply -NE, requires only
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that their incentive to deviate is less than , i.e. no player can increase their pay-
off more than  by changing their strategy. However, in order the approximation
guarantee to have a consistent meaning over all games it is usually assumed that
the utilities of the players are in [0, 1], so  ∈ [0, 1].
1.3.1 Bimatrix games
A fruitful line of work has developed studying the best approximations that can
be found in polynomial-time for bimatrix games. The most known and most
studied notion is that of approximate Nash equilibrium. There, after a number
of papers by Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [19, 20], Bosse, Byrka and
Markakis [7], the best known algorithm was given by Spirakis and Tsaknakis [66]
who provided a polynomial time algorithm, known as TS algorithm, that finds
a 0.3393-NE. Although, it is not known whether the guarantee of TS algorithm
is tight, there are examples upon which the algorithm finds no better than a
0.3385-NE [31].
A different notion of approximation is the -well-supported Nash equilibrium.
An -well-supported Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) is a pair of strategies in which
both players only place probability on strategies whose payoff is within  of the
maximum payoff. Every -WSNE is an -NE, but the converse does not hold. So,
-WSNE is a more restrictive notion. Although the computation of -NE received
a lot of attention the progress on computing -WSNE has been less forthcoming.
The first correct algorithm was provided by Kontogiannis and Spirakis [52] (KS
algorithm), who gave a polynomial time algorithm for finding a 2
3
-WSNE. This
was later slightly improved by Fearnley, Goldberg, Savani, and Sørensen [30]
who gave a new polynomial-time algorithm that extends the KS algorithm and
finds a 0.6608-WSNE; prior to this work, this was the best known approximation
guarantee for WSNEs. For the special case of symmetric games, i.e. bimatrix
games where the payoff matrix or the column player equals the transposed payoff
matrix of the row player, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a 0.5-
WSNE [16].
The existence of a fully polynomial approximation scheme (FPTAS) was ruled
out by Chen, Deng and Teng [12] unless PPAD = P. Recently, Rubinstein proved
that there is no polynomial approximation scheme (PTAS) assuming the End of
Line problem requires exponential time [64]. There is however a quasi-polynomial
approximation scheme given by Lipton, Markakis and Mehta [56].
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1.3.2 Many-player games
The study of -Nash equilibria in the context of many-player games has received
much less attention. A simple approximation algorithm for many-player games
can be obtained by generalising the algorithm of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadim-
itriou [20] from the two-player setting to the n-player setting, which provides a
guarantee of  = 1− 1
n
. This has since been improved independently by three sets
of authors [7, 8, 45]. They provide a method that converts a polynomial-time
algorithm for finding -Nash equilibria in (n− 1)-player games into an algorithm
that finds a 1
2− -Nash equilibrium in n-player games. Using the polynomial-time
0.3393 algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [66] for 2-player games as the base
case for this recursion, this allows us to provide polynomial-time algorithms with
approximation guarantees of 0.6022 in 3-player games, and 0.7153 in 4-player
games. These guarantees tend to 1 as n increases, and so far, no constant  < 1
is known such that, for all n, an -Nash equilibrium of an n-player game can be
computed in polynomial time.
For n-player games, we have lower bounds for -Nash equilibria. More pre-
cisely, Rubinstein has shown that when the number of players is not constant
there exists a constant but very small  such that it is PPAD-hard to compute
an -Nash equilibrium [63]. This is quite different from the bimatrix game set-
ting, where the existence of a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme rules
out such a lower bound, unless all of PPAD can be solved in quasi-polynomial
time [57]. On the other hand for any number of players with constant number of
pure strategies per player and every  > 0, Babichenko, Barman and Peretz [4]
showed that an -Nash equilibrium can be computed in quasi polynomial time.
1.3.3 Polymatrix games
Polymatrix games form a special class of many player games. In a polymatrix
game, the interaction between the players is specified by an n-vertex graph, where
each vertex represents one of the players. Each edge of the graph specifies a
bimatrix game that will be played by the two respective players, and thus a
player with degree d will play d bimatrix games simultaneously. More precisely,
each player picks a strategy, and then plays this strategy in all of the bimatrix
games that he is involved in. His payoff is then the sum of the payoffs that he
obtains in each of the games.
Polymatrix games form a class of succinctly represented n-player games: a
polymatrix game is specified by at most n2 bimatrix games, each of which can be
written down in quadratic space with respect to the number of strategies. This is
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unlike general n-player strategic form games, which require a representation that
is exponential in the number of players.
The problem of computing exact Nash equilibria in polymatrix games can be
tackled in exponential time by Lemke’s algorithm [46]. For the special subclass
of generalized zero sum games on networks Cai and Daskalakis [9] showed that
a Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. On the other hand,
there has been relatively little work on polynomial time algorithms for computing
approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games. The approximation algorithms
for general games can be applied in this setting in an obvious way, but prior to
this work there have been no upper bounds that are specific to polymatrix games.
On the other hand, the lower bound of Rubinstein mentioned above is actually
proved by constructing polymatrix games. Thus, there is a constant but very
small  such that it is PPAD-hard to compute an -Nash equilibrium [63], and
this again indicates that approximating equilibria in polymatrix games is quite
different to approximating equilibria in bimatrix games.
Polymatrix games have played a central role in the reductions that have been
used to show PPAD-hardness of games and other equilibrium problems [12, 13, 18,
27, 33]. Computing an exact Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game is PPAD-
hard even when all the bimatrix games played are either zero-sum games or
coordination games [9].
Polymatrix games have been used in other contexts too. For example, Govin-
dan and Wilson proposed a (non-polynomial-time) algorithm for computing Nash
equilibria of an n-player game by approximating the game with a sequence of
polymatrix games [40]. Later, they presented a (non-polynomial) reduction that
reduces n-player games to polymatrix games while preserving approximate Nash
equilibria [41]. Their reduction introduces a central coordinator player, who in-
teracts bilaterally with every player.
1.3.4 Lipschitz games
The results for games that are not in strategic form are even scarcer. An excep-
tion is the class of games that the utility functions for the players are Lipschitz
continuous. Intuitively, in a Lipschitz game a small change in a player’s strat-
egy does not change significantly his or his opponents’ payoff. Several papers
have studied how the Lipschitz continuity of the players’ payoff functions affects
the existence, the quality, and the complexity of the equilibria of the underlying
game. Azriely and Shmaya [2] studied many player games and derived bounds
for the Lipschitz constant of the utility functions for the players that guaran-
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tees the existence of a pure approximate equilibrium for the game. Daskalakis
and Papadimitriou [21] proved that anonymous games possess pure approximate
equilibria whose quality depends on the Lipschitz constant of the payoff func-
tions and the number of pure strategies the players have. They also proved that
this approximate equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore,
they gave a polynomial-time approximation scheme for anonymous games with
many players and constant number of pure strategies. Babichenko [3] presented
a best-reply dynamic for n players Lipschitz anonymous games with two strate-
gies which reaches an approximate pure equilibrium in O(n log n) steps. Deb and
Kalai [22] studied how some variants of the Lipschitz continuity of the utility
functions are sufficient to guarantee hindsight stability of equilibria.
1.3.5 Communication and Query Complexity of equilibria
Communication Complexity. Approximate Nash equilibria can also be stud-
ied from the communication complexity point of view, which captures the amount
of communication the players need to find a good approximate Nash equilibrium.
It models a natural scenario where the two players know their own payoff matrix,
but do not know their opponent’s payoff matrix. The players must then follow
a communication protocol that eventually produces strategies for both players.
The goal is to design a protocol that produces a sufficiently good -NE or -WSNE
while also minimizing the amount of communication between the two players.
Communication complexity of equilibria in games has been studied in previ-
ous works [14, 44]. The recent paper of Goldberg and Pastink [38] initiated the
study of communication complexity in the bimatrix game setting. There they
showed Θ(n2) communication, of the payoff matrices, is required to find an ex-
act Nash equilibrium of an n× n bimatrix game. Since these games have Θ(n2)
payoffs in total, this implies that there is no communication efficient protocol for
finding exact Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. For approximate equilibria, they
showed that one can find a 3
4
-Nash equilibrium without any communication, and
that in the no-communication setting, finding an 1
2
-Nash equilibrium is impossi-
ble. Motivated by these positive and negative results, they focused on the most
interesting setting, which allows only a polylogarithmic in the number of pure
strategies to be exchanged between the players. They demonstrated that one can
compute 0.438-NE and 0.732-WSNE in this setting.
Query Complexity. The payoff query model is motivated by practical appli-
cations of game theory. It is often the case that we know that there is a game
9
to be solved, but we do not know what the payoffs are, and in order to discover
the payoffs, we would have to play the game. This may be quite costly, so it is
natural to ask whether we can find an equilibrium of a game while minimizing
the number of experiments that we must perform.
Payoff queries model this situation. In the payoff query model we are told the
structure of the game, i.e., the strategy space, but we are not told the payoffs.
We can then make payoff queries, where we propose a pure strategy profile, and
we are told the payoff of each player under that strategy profile. Our task is
to compute an equilibrium of the game while minimizing the number of payoff
queries that we make.
The study of query complexity in bimatrix games was initiated by Fearnley,
Gairing, Goldberg and Savani [29], who gave a deterministic algorithm for finding
a 1
2
-NE using 2n−1 payoff queries. A subsequent paper of Fearnley and Savani [32]
showed a number of further results. Firstly, they showed an Ω(n2) lower bound
on the query complexity of finding an -NE with  < 1
2
, which combined with
the result above, gives a complete view of the deterministic query complexity of
approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. They then gave a randomized
algorithm that finds a (3−
√
5
2
+ )-NE using O(n·logn
2
) queries, and a randomized
algorithm that finds a (2
3
+ )-WSNE using O(n·logn
4
) queries.
1.4 Overview of Results
The contributions of this thesis are efficient algorithms for computing approximate
equilibria for several classes of games.
1.4.1 Bimatrix games
We introduce a distributed technique that allows us to efficiently compute ap-
proximate Nash equilibria and approximate well-supported Nash equilibria using
limited communication between the players.
Traditional methods for computing WSNEs have used an LP based approach
that, when used on a bimatrix game (R,C), solves the zero-sum game (R−C,C−
R), where R and C denote the payoff matrix for the row and column player
respectively. The Kontogiannis and Spirakis algorithm [53] (KS algorithm) uses
the fact that if there is no pure 2
3
-WSNE, then the solution to this zero-sum game
is a 2
3
-WSNE. The slight improvement of the algorithm of Fearnley, Goldberg,
Savani and Sørensen [30] (FGSS algorithm) to 0.6608 was obtained by adding
two further methods to the KS algorithm: if the KS algorithm does not produce
10
a 0.6608-WSNE, then either there is a 2 × 2 matching pennies sub-game that
is 0.6608-WSNE for the bimatrix game (R,C), or the strategies computed from
the zero-sum game can be improved by shifting the probabilities of both players
within their supports in order to produce a 0.6608-WSNE.
We take a different approach. We first show that the bound of 2
3
can be
matched using a pair of distributed LPs. Given a bimatrix game (R,C), we solve
the two zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C), and then give a straightforward
procedure that we call the base algorithm, which uses the solutions to these games
to produce a 2
3
-WSNE of (R,C). Goldberg and Pastnik [38] also considered this
pair of LPs, but their algorithm only produces a 0.732-WSNE. We then show
that the base algorithm can be improved by applying the probability-shifting and
matching-pennies ideas from the FGSS-algorithm. That is, if the base algorithm
fails to find a 0.6528-WSNE, then a 0.6528-WSNE can be obtained either by
shifting the probabilities of one of the two players, or by identifying a 2× 2 sub-
game where its exact NE corresponds to a 0.6528-WSNE. This gives a polynomial
time algorithm that computes a 0.6528-WSNE, which provides the best known
approximate guarantees for WSNEs.
It is worth pointing out that, while these techniques are thematically similar to
the ones used by the FGSS-algorithm, the actual implementation is significantly
different. The FGSS-algorithm attempts to improve the strategies by shifting
probabilities within the supports of the strategies returned by the zero-sum game,
with the goal of reducing the other player’s payoff. In our algorithm, we shift
probabilities away from bad strategies in order to improve that player’s payoff.
This type of analysis is possible because the base algorithm produces a strategy
profile in which one of the two players plays a pure strategy, which makes the
analysis we need to carry out much simpler. On the other hand, the KS-algorithm
can produce strategies in which both players play many strategies, and so the
analysis used for the FGSS-algorithm is necessarily more complicated.
Since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve
upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting. This is
because no communication is required for the row player to solve (R,−R) and
the column player to solve (−C,C). The players can then carry out the rest of
the algorithm using only poly-logarithmic communication. Hence, we obtain a
randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic com-
munication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE. Moreover, the base algorithm can be im-
plemented as a communication efficient algorithm for finding a (0.5 + )-WSNE
in a win-lose bimatrix game, where all payoffs are either 0 or 1.
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The algorithm can also be used to beat the best known bound in the query
complexity setting. It has already been shown by Goldberg and Roth [39] that
an -NE of a zero-sum game can be found by a randomized algorithm that uses
O(n logn
2
) payoff queries. Since the rest of the steps used by our algorithm can
also be carried out using O(n log n) payoff queries, this gives us a query efficient
algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE.
We also show that the base algorithm can be adapted to find a 3−
√
5
2
-NE in a
bimatrix game, which matches the bound given for the first algorithm of Bosse et
al. [7]. Once again, this can be implemented in a communication efficient manner,
and so we obtain an algorithm that computes a (3−
√
5
2
+ )-NE (i.e., 0.382-NE)
using only poly-logarithmic communication.
1.4.2 Polymatrix games
Our main result is an algorithm that, for every δ in the range 0 < δ ≤ 0.5, finds
a (0.5 + δ)-NE of a polymatrix game in time polynomial in the input size and 1
δ
,
assuming every player has maximum payoff 1 and minimum payoff 0. Note that
our approximation guarantee does not depend on the number of players, which is
a property that was not previously known to be achievable for polymatrix games,
for any constant  < 1, and still cannot be achieved for general strategic form
games.
We prove this result by adapting the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [66],
(TS algorithm). They give a gradient descent algorithm for finding a 0.3393-Nash
equilibrium in a bimatrix game. We generalise their gradient descent techniques
to the polymatrix setting, and show that it always arrives at a (0.5 + δ)-Nash
equilibrium after a polynomial number of iterations.
In order to generalise the TS algorithm we had to overcome several issues.
Firstly, the TS algorithm makes the regrets of the two players equal in every
iteration, but there is no obvious way to achieve this in the polymatrix setting.
Instead, we show how gradient descent can be applied to a strategy profile where
the regrets are not necessarily equal. Secondly, the output of the TS algorithm
is either a point found by gradient descent, or a point obtained by modifying
the result of gradient descent. In the polymatrix game setting, it is not im-
mediately obvious how such a modification can be derived with a non-constant
number of players (without an exponential blowup). Thus, we apply a different
analysis, which proves that the point resulting from gradient descent always has
our approximation guarantee. It is an interesting open question whether a better
approximation guarantee can be achieved when there is a constant number of
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players.
Furthermore, we show that our algorithm can be applied to two-player Bayesian
games. Rosenthal and Howson showed that the problem of finding an exact equi-
librium in a two-player Bayesian game is equivalent to finding an exact equilib-
rium in a polymatrix game [48]. We show that this correspondence also holds for
approximate equilibria: finding an -Nash equilibrium in these games can be re-
duced to the problem of finding an -Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game, and
therefore, our algorithm can be used to efficiently find a (0.5+δ)-Nash equilibrium
of a two-player Bayesian game.
1.4.3 Lipschitz games
We study three classes of games that are not strategic form; Lipschitz games,
Penalty games and Distance Biased games.
Lipschitz games. This is a very general class of games, where each player’s
strategy space is continuous, is represented by a convex set of vectors, and where
the only restriction is that the payoff function is Lipschitz continuous. This class
encompasses, for example, every concave game in which the payoffs are Lipschitz
continuous. This class is so general that exact equilibria, and even approximate
equilibria may not exist. Nevertheless, we give an efficient algorithm that either
outputs an -equilibrium, or determines that the game has no exact equilibria.
More precisely, for M -player games that are λ-continuous in the Lp norm, for
p ≥ 2, and where γ = max ‖x‖p over all x in the strategy space, we either
compute an -equilibrium or determine that no exact equilibrium exists in time
O
(
MnMk+l
)
, where k = O
(
λ2Mpγ2
2
)
and l = O
(
λ2pγ2
2
)
. Observe that this is a
polynomial time algorithm when λ, p, γ, M , and  are constant.
To prove this result, we utilize a recent result of Barman [5], which states
that for every vector in a convex set, there is another vector that is  close to the
original in the Lp norm, and is a convex combination of b points on the convex
hull, where b depends on p and , but does not depend on the dimension. This
result and the Lipschitz continuity of the payoff functions allow us to reduce
the task of finding an -equilibrium to checking only a small number of strategy
profiles, and thus we get a brute-force algorithm that is reminiscent of the QPTAS
given by Lipton, Mehta and Markakis [56] for bimatrix games.
However, life is not so simple for us. Since we study a very general class of
games, verifying whether a given strategy profile is an -equilibrium is a non-
trivial task. It requires us to compute a regret for each player, which is the differ-
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ence between the player’s best response payoff and their actual payoff. Computing
a best response in a bimatrix game is trivial, but for Lipschitz games, computing
a best response may be a hard problem. We get around this problem by instead
giving an algorithm to compute approximate best responses. Hence we find ap-
proximate regrets, and it turns out that this is sufficient for our algorithm to
work.
Penalty games. In these games, the players play a strategic form game, and
their utility is the payoff achieved in the game minus a penalty. The penalty
function can be an arbitrary function that depends on the player’s strategy. This
is a general class of games that encompasses a number of games that have been
studied before. The biased games studied in [10] are penalty games where the
penalty is determined by the amount each player deviates from a specified base
strategy. The biased model was studied in the past by psychologists [67] and it
is close to what they call anchoring [49, 11]. Anchoring is common in poker 2
and in fact there are several papers on poker that are reminiscent of anchoring
[36, 37, 47]. In their seminal paper, Fiat and Papadimitriou [34] introduced a
model for risk prone games. This model resembles penalty games since the risk
component can be encoded in the penalty function. Mavronicolas and Monien [58]
followed this line of research and provided results on the complexity of deciding
if such games possess an equilibrium.
We again show that Lipschitz continuity helps us to find approximate equilib-
ria. The only assumption that we make is that the penalty function is Lipschitz
continuous in an Lp norm with p ≥ 2. Again, this is a weak restriction and it does
not guarantee that exact equilibria exist. Even so, we give a quasi-polynomial
time algorithm that either finds an -equilibrium, or verifies that the game has
no exact equilibrium.
We take a similar approach, but since our games are more complicated, our
proof is necessarily more involved. In particular, in [56], proving that the sampled
strategies are an approximate equilibrium only requires showing that the expected
payoff is close the payoff of a pure best response. In penalty games, best response
strategies are not necessarily pure, and so the events that we must consider are
more complex.
Distance biased games. Biased games, are a subclass of penalty games that
have been studied recently by Caragiannis, Kurokawa and Procaccia [10]. They
2http://www.pokerology.com/articles/anchoring-bias/
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showed that, under very mild assumptions on the bias function, biased games
always have an exact equilibrium. Furthermore, for the case where the bias
function is either the L1 norm, or the L
2
2 norm, they give an exponential time
algorithm for finding an exact equilibrium.
Our results for penalty games already give a QPTAS for biased games, but we
are also interested in whether there are polynomial-time algorithms that can find
non-trivial approximations. We give a positive answer to this question for games
where the bias is the L1 norm, the L
2
2 norm, or the L∞ norm. We follow the well-
known approach of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [20], who gave a simple
algorithm for finding a 0.5-approximate equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Their
approach is as follows: start with an arbitrary strategy x for player 1, compute
a best response j for player 2 against x, and then compute a best response i for
player 1 against j. Player 1 mixes uniformly between x and i, while player 2
plays j.
We show that this algorithm also works for biased games, although the gen-
eralisation is not entirely trivial. Again, this is because best responses cannot be
trivially computed in biased games. For the L1 and L∞ norms, best responses can
be computed via linear programming, and for the L22 norm, best responses can
be formulated as a quadratic program. It turns out that this particular QP can
be solved in polynomial time by the ellipsoid method. However, none of these
algorithms is strongly polynomial. We show that, for each of the norms, best
responses can be found by a simple strongly-polynomial combinatorial algorithm.
We then analyse the quality of approximation provided by the technique of [20].
We obtain a strongly polynomial algorithm for finding a 2/3 approximation in L1
and L∞ biased games, and a strongly polynomial algorithm for finding a 5/7 ap-
proximation in L22 biased games. For the latter result, in the special case where
the bias function is the inner product of the player’s strategy we find a 13/21
approximation.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this Chapter we introduce the necessary notation that will be used throughout
this thesis.
2.1 Games, Strategies and Utility Functions
We start by fixing some notation. For each positive integer n we use [n] to denote
the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and when a universe [n] is clear, we will use S¯ = {i ∈ [n], i /∈
S} to denote the complement of S ⊆ [n]. For an n-dimensional vector x, we use
x−S to denote the elements of x with indices in S¯, and in the case where S = {i}
has only one element, we simply write x−i for x−S. We use ∆n to denote the
(n − 1)-dimensional simplex, formally ∆n := {x : x ∈ Rn, x ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}.
Furthermore, we use ‖x‖p to denote the p-norm of a vector x ∈ Rd, i.e. ‖x‖p =(∑
i∈[d] |xi|p
)1/p
. Given a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd, we use conv(X) to
denote the convex hull of X. A vector y ∈ conv(X) is said to be k-uniform with
respect to X if there exists a size k multiset S of [n] such that y = 1
k
∑
i∈S xi.
When X is clear from the context we will simply say that a vector is k uniform
without mentioning that uniformity is with respect to X.
Games and strategies. A game with n players can be described by a set
of available actions for each player and a utility function for each player that
depends both on his chosen action and the actions the rest of the players chose.
Definition 1 (Game). An n-player game Γ is defined by
• a set of players N = [n],
• a set of available actions Si for every player i ∈ [n],
• a utility function ui : S1 × . . .× Sn → R for every player i ∈ [n].
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Strategies. For each player i ∈ [n] we will call Si as strategy space. We will use
xi ∈ Si to denote a specific action chosen by player i and we will call it as the
strategy of player i. In order to play the game, all players simultaneously select a
strategy from their strategy set and we use X = (x1, . . . , xn) to denote a strategy
profile of the game. When player i ∈ [n] chooses an action deterministically from
his strategy space, we will say that player i plays a pure strategy. If the player
randomises over some actions according to a probability distribution, we will say
that he plays a mixed strategy. We use ui(X) = ui(xi,X−i) to denote the utility of
player i when he plays the strategy xi and the rest of the players play according
to the strategy profile X−i.
Best responses. A strategy xˆi is a best response against the strategy profile
X−i, if ui(xˆi,X−i) ≥ ui(xi,X−i) for all xi ∈ Si. The regret player i suffers under
a strategy profile X is the difference between the utility of his best response and
his utility under X, i.e. ui(xˆi,X−i)− ui(xi,X−i).
The Definition 1 above is quite general. If extra constraints are imposed on
the number of the players and/or on the utility functions, then several classes
of games can be constructed. In this thesis the following classes of games are
studied: bimatrix (or two player) games, polymatrix games, Bayesian two player
games, Lipschitz games, concave games, penalty games, biased games, and dis-
tance biased games. In each of the following chapters we will define explicitly
and study the aforementioned classes games.
2.2 Solution Concepts
The standard solution concept in game theory is the equilibrium. A strategy pro-
file is an equilibrium if no player can increase his utility by unilaterally changing
his strategy.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium). The strategy profile X is an equilibrium for an n-
player game Γ if and only if for all i ∈ [n] it holds that ui(xi,X−i) ≥ ui(x′i,X−i)
for all possible x′i ∈ ∆Si.
When we refer to bimatrix, polymatrix, or Bayesian two player games we will
call the equilibria as Nash equilibria, while for the rest of the classes we will call
them simply as equilibria. We make this distinction because Nash’s theorem [60]
does not hold for the classes of Lipschitz, concave, penalty, biased, and distance
biased games.
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2.2.1 Approximate Equilibria
In this thesis we study a “relaxed” notion of equilibria which we call approximate
equilibria. More specifically, we study additive approximate equilibria. For any
 > 0, an additive -approximate equilibrium, or simply -equilibrium, is a strat-
egy profile where no player can increase his payoff more than  by unilaterally
changing his strategy.
Definition 3 (-equilibrium). Let  > 0. The strategy profile X is an -equilibrium
for an n-player game if and only if for all players i ∈ [n] it holds that ui(xi,X−i) ≥
ui(x
′
i,X−i)−  for all possible x′i ∈ ∆Si.
If under the strategy profile X a player can increase his payoff by  by unilat-
erally changing his strategy xi, then we say that the player suffers  regret.
2.2.2 Payoff rescaling
Observe that in order an -equilibrium to be a meaningful solution concept for a
game, it must have the same meaning for every player. Consider for example the
scenario of a strategy profile for a two player game where no player can increase
his payoff more than one. Assume furthermore that under this strategy profile
the first player gets utility zero, while the second player gets utility of a million.
The incentive for the first player to change his strategy is much stronger than the
incentive of the second player.
In order to overcome this inefficiency of the definition of -equilibrium we must
make some assumptions on the utility functions. The standard assumption in the
field of approximate equilibria is that the utility for every player is normalised in
[0, 1], thus the value of  has the same effect in every player. This normalisation
does not affect the exact equilibria of the game and if it is applied carefully it does
not affect the approximate equilibria of the game either. In the following chapters,
if we do not mention how to normalise the utilities of the players we implicitly
assume that are already normalised in [0, 1]. In Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 we
explain in detail how to normalise the utilities in polymatrix and Bayesian two
player games respectively.
2.3 Game Sizes
The size of a game is defined by the number of bits required in order to represent
it. In order to define the size of a game it is sufficient just to describe the utility
functions of the players that are involved in it. Notice that for an n-player game
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if |Si| = s for all i ∈ [n], then there are sn different strategy profiles for the game.
This means that nsn payoffs have to be described in order to represent the game.
This is exponential in the number of players. In this thesis we focus only on
games with succint representation, i.e. the size of the game is polynomial in the
number of the players of the game.
Bimatrix games are succinctly represented games; when each player has s
pure strategies, then the size of the game is 2s2. Polymatrix games form a class
of succinctly represented n-player games: a polymatrix game is specified by at
most n2 bimatrix games, each of which can be written down in quadratic space
with respect to the number of strategies and Bayesian two-player games have a
succinct representation too, since such a game can be reduced to a polymatrix
game (we will explain these in detail in Chapters 4 and 5).
Observe though that we implicitly make an assumption on the payoffs repre-
sentation. We assume that each payoff needs at most polylogarithmic bits to be
described.
In games with concave utility functions the size of the game depends on how
the utility functions for the players are represented. Throughout this thesis we
will assume that the utility functions for all players have a succinct representation.
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Chapter 3
Bimatrix Games
In this chapter we present a distributed method to compute approximate Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the
two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that
combines the two players’ payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent
LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff matrices, and then
computes an approximate Nash equilibrium using only limited communication
between the players.
Our method gives improved bounds on the complexity of computing ap-
proximate Nash equilibria in a number of different settings. Firstly, it gives a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate well supported Nash equi-
libria (WSNE) that always finds a 0.6528-WSNE, beating the previous best guar-
antee of 0.6608. Secondly, since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can
be applied to give an improved bound in the limited communication setting, giv-
ing a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic
communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE which beats the previous best known
guarantee of 0.732. It can also be applied to the case of approximate Nash equi-
libria, where we obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that
uses poly-logarithmic communication and always finds a 0.382-approximate Nash
equilibrium, which improves the previous best guarantee of 0.438. Finally, the
method can also be applied in the query complexity setting to give an algorithm
that makes O(n log n) payoff queries and always finds a 0.6528-WSNE, which
improves the previous best known guarantee of 2/3.
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3.1 Bimatrix games preliminaries
An n ×m bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two n ×m matrices: R defines the
payoff for the row player, and C defines the payoff for the column player. Without
loss of generality and for notation simplicity, we will assume that m = n. We
note however that our algorithm works even if m 6= n. We make the standard
assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. So, each player has n pure
strategies. To play the game, the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the column
player selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives payoff Ri,j, and the
column player receives payoff Ci,j.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n]. We denote a mixed
strategy for the row player as a vector x of length n, such that xi is the probability
that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of the column
player is a vector y of length n, with the same interpretation. Given a mixed
strategy x for either player, the support of x is the set of pure strategies i with
xi > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row and the column player,
respectively, then we call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile. The expected payoff
for the row player under the strategy profile (x,y) is given by xTRy and for the
column player by xTCy. We denote the support of a strategy x as supp(x), which
gives the set of pure strategies i such that xi > 0.
Nash equilibria. Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player. The set of
pure best responses against y for the row player is the set of pure strategies that
maximize the payoff against y. More formally, a pure strategy i ∈ [n] is a best
response against y if, for all pure strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have: ∑j∈[n] yj · Ri,j ≥∑
j∈[n] yj ·Ri′,j. Column player best responses are defined analogously.
A mixed strategy profile (x,y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if every pure
strategy in supp(x) is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in
supp(y) is a best response against x. Observe that in a Nash equilibrium, each
player’s expected payoff is equal to their best response payoff.
Approximate Equilibria. There are two commonly studied notions of ap-
proximate equilibrium, and we consider both of them in this chapter. The first
notion is of an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE), which weakens the re-
quirement that a player’s expected payoff should be equal to their best response
payoff. Formally, given a strategy profile (x,y), we define the regret suffered
by the row player to be the difference between the best response payoff and the
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actual payoff:
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− xT ·R · y.
Regret for the column player is defined analogously. We have that (x,y) is an
-NE if and only if both players have regret less than or equal to .
The other notion is of an -approximate-well-supported equilibrium (-WSNE),
which weakens the requirement that players only place probability on best re-
sponse strategies. Given a strategy profile (x,y) and a pure strategy j ∈ [n], we
say that j is an -best-response for the row player if:
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− (R · y)j ≤ .
An -WSNE requires that both players only place probability on -best-responses.
Formally, the row player’s pure strategy regret under (x,y) is defined to be:
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− min
i∈supp(x)
(
(R · y)i
)
.
Pure strategy regret for the column player is defined analogously. A strategy
profile (x,y) is an -WSNE if both players have pure strategy regret less than or
equal to .
Communication complexity. We consider the communication model for bi-
matrix games introduced by Goldberg and Pastink [38]. In this model, both
players know the payoffs in their own payoff matrix, but do not know the pay-
offs in their opponent’s matrix. The players then follow an algorithm that uses a
number of communication rounds, where in each round they exchange a single bit
of information. Between each communication round, the players are permitted to
perform arbitrary randomized computations (although it should be noted that, in
this chapter, the players will only perform polynomial-time computations) using
their payoff matrix, and the bits that they have received so far. At the end of
the algorithm, the row player outputs a mixed strategy x, and the column player
outputs a mixed strategy y.
The goal is to produce a strategy profile (x,y) that is an -NE or -WSNE for
a sufficiently small  while limiting the number of communication rounds used by
the algorithm. The algorithms given in this chapter will use at most O(log2 n)
communication rounds.
23
Query complexity. In the query complexity setting, the algorithm knows that
the players will play an n×n game (R,C), but it does not know any of the entries
of R or C. These payoffs are obtained using payoff queries in which the algorithm
proposes a pure strategy profile (i, j), and then it is told the value of Rij and
Cij. After each payoff query, the algorithm can make arbitrary computations
(although, again, in this chapter the algorithms that we consider take polynomial
time) in order to decide the next pure strategy profile to query. After making a
sequence of payoff queries, the algorithm then outputs a mixed strategy profile
(x,y). Again, the goal is to ensure that this strategy profile is an -NE or -
WSNE, while minimizing the number of queries made overall.
3.2 An Algorithm for Finding a 23-WSNE
In this section, we introduce an algorithm that we call the base algorithm. This
algorithm provides a simple way to find a 2
3
-WSNE. We present this algorithm
separately for three reasons.
• We believe that the algorithm is interesting on its own right, since it provides
a relatively straightforward method for finding a 2
3
-WSNE that is quite
different from the technique used in the KS-algorithm.
• Our algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE will replace the final step of the
algorithm with two more involved procedures, so it is worth understanding
this algorithm before we describe how it can be improved.
• We will show that this algorithm can be adapted to provide a communica-
tion efficient way to find a (0.5 + )-WSNE in win-lose games.
The algorithm. Our algorithm solves two zero-sum games. We say that the
strategy x secures value v for the row player, if xTRy ≥ v for every possible y.
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Algorithm 1: The base algorithm
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
• Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(−C,C).
• Let vr be the value secured by x∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 2/3, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj · x∗ ≤ 2/3, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
• Let j∗ be a pure best response to x∗.
• Find a row i such that Rij∗ > 1/3 and Cij∗ > 1/3.
• Return (i, j∗).
We argue that this algorithm is correct. For that reason, we must prove that
the row i used in Step 4 actually exists, which we do in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If Algorithm 1 reaches Step 4, then there exists a row i such that
Rij∗ > 1/3 and Cij∗ > 1/3.
Proof. Let i be a row sampled from x∗. We will show that there is a positive
probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
We begin by showing that the probability Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13) is less than 0.5. Let
the random variable T = 1 − Rij∗ . Since vr > 23 , we have that E[T ] < 13 . Thus,
applying Markov’s inequality we obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
) ≤ E[T ]
2/3
< 0.5.
Since Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13) = Pr(T ≥ 23) we can therefore conclude that Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13) <
0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(Cij∗ ≤ 13) < 0.5, by
using the fact that CTj∗ · x∗ > 23 .
We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 1
3
or Cij∗ ≤ 1
3
) < 1.
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies Rij∗ >
1
3
and Cij∗ >
1
3
, so
such a row must exist.
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We now argue that the algorithm always produces a 2
3
-WSNE. There are
three possible strategy profiles that can be returned by the algorithm, which we
consider individually.
The algorithm returns in Step 2. Since vc ≤ vr by assumption, and since
vr ≤ 23 , we have that (R · y∗)i ≤ 23 for every row i, and ((xˆ)T · C)j ≤ 23 for
every column j. So, both players can have pure strategy regret at most 2
3
in (xˆ,y∗), and thus this profile is a 2
3
-WSNE.
The algorithm returns in Step 3. Much like in the previous case, when the
column player plays y∗, the row player can have pure strategy regret at
most 2
3
. The requirement that CTj x
∗ ≤ 2
3
also ensures that the column
player has pure strategy regret at most 2
3
. Thus, we have that (x∗,y∗) is a
2
3
-WSNE.
The algorithm returns in Step 4. Both players have payoff at least 1
3
under
(i, j∗) for the sole strategy in their respective supports. Hence, the maximum
pure strategy regret that can be suffered by a player is 1− 1
3
= 2
3
.
Observe that the zero-sum game solved in Step 1 can be solved via linear pro-
gramming, and so the algorithm runs in polynomial time. Therefore, we have
shown the following.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 always produces a 2
3
-WSNE in polynomial time.
3.3 An Algorithm for Finding a 0.6528-WSNE
In this section, we show how Algorithm 1 can be modified to produce a 0.6528-
WSNE. We begin by giving an overview of the techniques used, we then give the
algorithm, and finally we analyse the quality of WSNE that it produces.
Outline. The idea behind our algorithm is to replace Step 4 of Algorithm 1
with a more involved procedure. This procedure uses two techniques that both
find an -WSNE with  < 2
3
.
Firstly, we attempt to turn (x∗, j∗) into a WSNE by shifting probabilities.
Observe that, since j∗ is a best response, the column player has a pure strategy
regret of 0 in (x∗, j∗). On the other hand, we have no guarantees about the row
player since x∗ might place a small amount of probability on strategies with payoff
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strictly less than 1
3
. However, since x∗ achieves a high expected payoff, (due to
Step 2) it cannot place too much probability on these low payoff strategies. Thus,
the idea is to shift the probability that x∗ assigns to entries of j∗ with payoff less
than or equal to 1
3
to entries with payoff strictly greater than 1
3
, and thus ensure
that the row player’s pure strategy regret is below 2
3
. Of course, this procedure
will increase the pure strategy regret of the column player, but if it is also below 2
3
once all probability has been shifted, then we have found an -WSNE with  < 2
3
.
If shifting probabilities fails to find an -WSNE with  < 2
3
, then we show that
the game contains a matching pennies sub-game. More precisely, we show that
there exists a column j′, and rows b and s such that the 2× 2 sub-game induced
by j∗, j′, b, and s has the following form:
@
@
I
II
b
s
j∗ j′
≈ 1 0
0 ≈ 1
0 ≈ 1
≈ 1 0
Thus, if both players play uniformly over their respective pair of strategies, then
j∗, j′, b, and s with have payoff ≈ 0.5, and so this yields an -WSNE with  < 2
3
.
The algorithm. We now formalize this approach, and show that it always finds
an -WSNE with  < 2
3
. In order to quantify the precise  that we obtain, we
parametrise the algorithm by a variable z, which we constrain to be in [0, 1
24
).
With the exception of the matching pennies step, all other steps of the algo-
rithm will return a (2
3
− z)-WSNE, while the matching pennies step will return
a (1
2
+ f(z))-WSNE for some increasing function f . Optimising the tradeoff be-
tween 2
3
− z and 1
2
+ f(z) then allows us to determine the quality of WSNE found
by our algorithm.
Algorithm 2 presents the aforementioned. Observe that Steps 1, 2, and 3 are
versions of the corresponding steps from Algorithm 1 which have been adapted to
produce a (2
3
− z)-WSNE. Step 4 implements the probability shifting procedure,
while Step 5 finds a matching pennies sub-game.
Observe that the probabilities used in xmp and ymp are only well defined
when z ≤ 1
24
, because we have that 1−15z
2−39z > 1 whenever z >
1
24
, which explains
our required upper bound on z.
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Algorithm 2
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
• Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
• Let vr be the value secured by x∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 2/3− z, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj x∗ ≤ 2/3− z, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
• Let j∗ be a pure best response against x∗. Define:
S := {i ∈ supp(x∗) : Rij∗ < 1/3 + z}
B := supp(x∗) \ S
• Define the strategy xb as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
(xb)i =
{
1
Pr(B)
· x∗i if i ∈ B
0 otherwise.
• If (xbT · C)j∗ ≥ 13 + z, then return (xb, j∗).
5. Otherwise:
• Let j′ be a pure best response against xb.
• If there exists an i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j∗) or (i, j′) is a pure
(2
3
− z)-WSNE, then return it.
• Find a row b ∈ B such that Rbj∗ > 1− 18z1+3z and Cbj′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
• Find a row s ∈ S such that Csj∗ > 1− 27z1+3z and Rsj′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
• Define the row player strategy xmp and the column player strat-
egy ymp as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
xmpi =

1−24z
2−39z if i = b,
1−15z
2−39z if i = s,
0 otherwise.
ympi =

1−24z
2−39z if i = j
∗,
1−15z
2−39z if i = j
′,
0 otherwise.
• Return (xmp,ymp).
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The correctness of Step 5. This step of the algorithm relies on the existence
of the rows b and s, which is not at all trivial. This is shown in the following
lemma. The proof of this lemma is quite lengthy, and is given in full detail in
Section 3.3.3.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. x∗ has payoff at least 2
3
− z against j∗.
2. j∗ has payoff at least 2
3
− z against x∗.
3. x∗ has payoff at least 2
3
− z against j′.
4. Neither j∗ or j′ contains a pure (2
3
− z)-WSNE (i, j) with i ∈ supp(x∗).
Then, both of the following are true:
• There exists a row b ∈ B such that Rbj∗ > 1− 18z1+3z and Cbj′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
• There exists a row s ∈ S such that Csj∗ > 1− 27z1+3z and Rsj′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
The lemma explicitly states the preconditions that need to hold because we
will reuse it in our communication complexity and query complexity results. Ob-
serve that the preconditions are indeed true if the Algorithm reaches Step 5. The
first and third conditions hold because, due to Step 2, we know that x∗ is a min-
max strategy that secures payoff at least vr >
2
3
− z. The second condition holds
because Step 3 ensures that the column player’s best response payoff is at least
2
3
− z. The fourth condition holds because Step 5 explicitly checks for these pure
strategy profiles.
Overview of the proof of Lemma 2. We now give an overview of the ideas
used in the proof which can be found in Section 3.3.3. The majority of the proof
is dedicated to proving four facts, which we outline below. First we determine
the structure of the row j∗. Here we use the fact that in the strategy profile
(x∗, j∗) both players have expected payoff close to 2
3
, but there does not exist a
row i ∈ supp(x∗) such that Rij∗ ≥ 13 + z and Cij∗ ≥ 13 + z (because such a row
would constitute a pure (2
3
− z)-WSNE.) The only way this is possible is when
both of the following facts hold.
1. Most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with Rij∗ ≈ 1 and
Cij∗ ≈ 13 .
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2. Most of the probability assigned to S is placed on rows i with Rij∗ ≈ 13 and
Cij∗ ≈ 1.
Moreover, x∗ must assign roughly half of its probability to rows in B and half of
its probability to rows in S.
Next, we observe that since Step 4 failed to produce a (2
3
− z)-WSNE, it must
be the case that j∗ is not a (2
3
− z)-best-response against xb, and the payoff of j∗
against xb is approximately
1
3
, it must be the case that the payoff of j′ against
xb is close to 1. The only way this is possible is if most column player payoffs
for rows in B are close to 1. However, if this is the case, then since j∗ does not
contain a pure (2
3
− z)-WSNE, we have that most row player payoffs in B must
be below 1
3
+ z. This gives us our third fact.
3. Most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with Rij′ <
1
3
+ z
and Cij′ ≈ 1.
For the fourth fact, we recall that x∗ is a min-max strategy that guarantees
payoff at least vr >
2
3
− z, so the payoff of x∗ against j′ must be at least 2
3
− z.
However, since most rows i ∈ B have Rij′ < 13 + z, and since x∗ places roughly
half its probability on B, it must be the case that most row player payoffs in S
are close to 1. This gives us our final fact.
4. Most of the probability assigned to S is placed on rows i with Rij′ ≈ 1.
Our four facts only describe the expected payoff of the rows in B and S for
the columns j∗ and j′. The final step of the proof is to pick out two particular
rows that satisfy the desired properties. For the row b we use Facts 1 and 3,
observing that if most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with
Rij∗ ≈ 1, and on rows i with Cij∗ ≈ 1, then it must be the case that both of these
conditions can be simultaneously satisfied by a single row b. The existence of s
is proved by the same argument using Facts 2 and 4.
Quality of approximation. We now analyse the quality of WSNE that our
algorithm produces. Steps 2, 3, 4, 5 each return a strategy profile. Observe
that Steps 2 and 3 are the same as the respective steps in the base algorithm,
but with the threshold changed from 2
3
to 2
3
− z. Hence, we can use the same
reasoning as we gave for the base algorithm to argue that these steps always
return (2
3
− z)-WSNE. We now consider the other two steps.
The algorithm returns in Step 4. By definition all rows r ∈ B satisfy Rij∗ ≥
1
3
+z, so since supp(xb) ⊆ B, the pure strategy regret of the row player can
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be at most 1−(1
3
+z) = 2
3
−z. For the same reason, since (xbT ·C)j∗ ≥ 13 +z
holds, the pure strategy regret of the column player can also be at 2
3
− z.
Thus, the profile (xb, j
∗) is a (2
3
− z)-WSNE.
The algorithm returns in Step 5. Since Rbj∗ > 1− 18z1+3z , the payoff of b when
the column player plays ymp is at least:
1− 24z
2− 39z ·
(
1− 18z
1 + 3z
)
=
1− 39z + 360z2
2− 33z − 117z2
Similarly, since Rsj′ > 1 − 27z1+3z , the payoff of s when the column player
plays ymp is at least:
1− 15z
2− 39z ·
(
1− 27z
1 + 3z
)
=
1− 39z + 360z2
2− 33z − 117z2
In the same way, one can show that the payoffs of j∗ and j′ are also 1−39z+360z
2
2−33z−117z2
when the row player plays xmp. Thus, we have that (xmp,ymp) is a (1 −
1−39z+360z2
2−33z−117z2 )-WSNE.
To find the optimal value for z, we need to find the largest value of z for which
the following inequality holds.
1− 1− 39z + 360z
2
2− 33z − 117z2 ≤
2
3
− z.
Setting the inequality to an equality and rearranging gives the following cubic
polynomial equation.
117 z3 + 432 z2 − 30 z + 1
3
= 0.
Since the discriminant of this polynomial is positive, this polynomial has three
real roots, which can be found via the trigonometric method. Only one of these
roots lies in the range 0 ≤ z < 1
24
, which is the following:
z =
1
117
√
3
(√
2434
√
3 cos
(
1
3
arctan
(
39
240073
√
9749
√
3
))
− 3
√
2434 sin
(
1
3
arctan
(
39
240073
√
9749
√
3
))
− 48
√
3
)
.
Thus, we get z ≈ 0.013906376, and as result we have found an algorithm that
always produces a 0.6528-WSNE. Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a bimatrix game,
finds a 0.6528-WSNE.
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3.3.1 Communication Complexity of the Algorithm
We claim that our algorithm can be adapted for the limited communication set-
ting. We make the following modification to our algorithm. In order to achieve
this, we use the following result of [38].
Lemma 3 (Goldberg and Pastink [38]). Given a mixed strategy x for the row
player and an  > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm
that uses O( log
2 n
2
)-communication to transmit a strategy xs to the column player
where |supp(xs)| ∈ O( logn2 ) and for every strategy i ∈ [n] we have:
|(xT ·R)i − (xTs ·R)i| ≤ .
The algorithm uses the well-known sampling technique of Lipton, Markakis,
and Mehta [56] to construct the strategy xs, so for this reason we will call the
strategy xs the sampled strategy from x. Since this strategy has a logarithmically
sized support, it can be transmitted by sending O( logn
2
) strategy indexes, each
of which can be represented using log n bits. By symmetry, the algorithm can
obviously also be used to transmit approximations of column player strategies to
the row player.
After Algorithm 2 computes x∗,y∗, xˆ, and yˆ, we then use Lemma 3 to con-
struct and communicate the sampled strategies x∗s,y
∗
s , xˆs, and yˆs. These strate-
gies are communicated between the two players using 4 · (log n)2 bits of communi-
cation, and the players also exchange vr = (x
∗
s)
TRy∗s and vc = xˆ
T
s Cyˆs using log n
rounds of communication. The algorithm then continues as before, except the
sampled strategies that are now used in place of their non-sampled counterparts.
Finally, in Steps 2 and 3, we test against the threshold 2
3
− z+  instead of 2
3
− z.
Observe that, when sampled strategies are used, all steps of the algorithm can
be carried out in at most (log n)2 communication. In particular, to implement
Step 4, the column player can communicate j∗ to the row player, and then the
row player can communicate Rij∗ for all rows i ∈ supp(x∗s) using (log n)2 bits of
communication, if we assume that the payoff entries have constant or polyloga-
rithmic length, which allows the column player to determine j′. Once j′ has been
determined, there are only 2 · log n payoffs in each matrix that are relevant to the
algorithm (the payoffs in rows i ∈ supp(x∗s) in columns j∗ and j′) and so the two
players can communicate all of these payoffs to each other, and then no further
communication is necessary.
Now, we must argue that this modified algorithm is correct. Firstly, we argue
that if the modified algorithm reaches Step 5, then the rows b and s exist. To do
this, we observe that the required preconditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied by x∗s,
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j∗, and j′. Condition 2 holds because the modified Step 3 ensures that the column
player’s best response payoff is at least 2
3
− z +  > 2
3
− z, while Condition 4
is ensured by the explicit check in Step 5. For Conditions 1 and 3, we use the
fact that (x∗,y∗) is an -Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game (R,−R). The
following lemma shows that any approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum
game behaves like an approximate min-max strategy.
Lemma 4. If (x,y) is an -NE of a zero-sum game (M,−M), then for every
strategy y′ we have:
xTMy′ ≥ xTMy − .
Proof. Let v = xTMy be the payoff to the row player under (x,y). Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that there exists a column player strategy y′ such that:
xTMy′ < v − .
Since the game is zero-sum, this means that the column player’s payoff under
(x,y′) is strictly larger than −v + , which then directly implies that the best
response payoff for the column player against x is strictly larger than −v + .
However, since the column player’s expected payoff under (x,y) is −v, this then
implies that (x,y) is not an -NE, which provides our contradiction.
Since Step 2 suggests that the row player’s payoff in (x∗,y∗) is at least 2
3
−z+,
Lemma 4 implies that x∗ secures a payoff of 2
3
− z no matter what strategy the
column player plays, which then implies that Conditions 1 and 3 of Lemma 2
hold.
Finally, we argue that the algorithm finds a (0.6528+). The modified Steps 2
and 3 now return a (2
3
− z + )-WSNE, whereas the approximation guarantees of
the other steps are unchanged. Thus, we can reuse our original analysis to obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For every  > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time
algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
2
)
communication and finds a (0.6528 + )-WSNE.
3.3.2 Query Complexity of the Algorithm
We now show that Algorithm 2 can be implemented in a payoff-query efficient
manner. There are two results that we will use for this setting. Goldberg and
Roth [39] have given a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds an
-NE of a zero-sum game using O(n·logn
2
) payoff queries. Given a mixed strategy
profile (x,y), an -approximate payoff vector for the row player is a vector v such
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that, for all i ∈ [n] we have |vi − (R · y)i| ≤ . Approximate payoff vectors for
the column player are defined symmetrically. Fearnley and Savani [32] observed
that there is a randomized algorithm that when given the strategy profile (x,y),
finds approximate payoff vectors for both players using O(n·logn
2
) payoff queries
and that succeeds with high probability. We summarise these two results in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5 ([39, 32]). Given an n × n zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability
at least (1 − n− 18 )(1 − 2
n
)2, we can compute an -Nash equilibrium (x,y), and
-approximate payoff vectors for both players under (x,y), using O(n·logn
2
) payoff
queries.
Let  > 0 be a positive constant. We now outline the changes needed in the
algorithm.
• In Step 1 we use the algorithm of Lemma 5 to find 
2
-NEs of (R,−R), and
(C,−C). We denote the mixed strategies found as (x∗a,y∗a) and (xˆa, yˆa),
respectively, and we use these strategies in place of their original counter-
parts throughout the rest of the algorithm. We also compute 
2
-approximate
payoff vectors for each of these strategies, and use them whenever we need
to know the payoff of a particular strategy under one of these strategies. In
particular, we set vr to be the payoff of x
∗
a according to the approximate
payoff vector of y∗a, and we set vc to be the payoff of yˆa according to the
approximate payoff vector for xˆa.
• In Steps 2 and 3 we test against the threshold of 2
3
−z+  rather than 2
3
−z.
• In Step 4 we select j∗ to be the column that is maximal in the approximate
payoff vector against x∗a. We then spend n payoff queries to query every
row in column j∗, which allow us to proceed with the rest of this step as
before.
• In Step 5 we use the algorithm of Lemma 5 to find an approximate payoff
vector v for the column player against xb. We then select j
′ to be a column
that maximizes v, and then spend n payoff queries to query every row in
j∗, which allows us to proceed with the rest of this step as before.
Observe that the query complexity of the algorithm is O(n·logn
2
), where the
dominating term arises due to the use of the algorithm from Lemma 5 to approx-
imate solutions to the zero-sum games.
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We now argue that this modified algorithm produces a (0.6528 + )-WSNE.
Firstly, we need to reestablish the existence of the rows b and s used in Step 5. To
do this, we observe that the preconditions of Lemma 2 hold for x∗a. We start with
Conditions 1 and 3. Note that the payoff for the row player under (x∗a,y
∗
a) is at
least vr− 2 (since vr was estimated with approximate payoff vectors,) and Step 2
ensures that vr >
2
3
−z+. Hence, we can apply Lemma 4 to argue that x∗a secures
payoff at least 2
3
−z against every strategy of the column player, which proves that
Conditions 1 and 3 hold. Condition 2 holds because the check in Step 3, ensures
that the approximate payoff of j∗ against x∗ is at least 2
3
− z + , and therefore
the actual payoff of j∗ against x∗ is at least 2
3
− z+ 
2
. Finally, Condition 4 holds
because pure strategy profiles of this form are explicitly checked for in Step 5.
Steps 2 and 3 in the modified algorithm return a (2
3
− z+ )-WSNE, while the
other steps provide the same approximation guarantee as the original algorithm.
So, we can reuse the analysis for the original algorithm to prove the following
theorem. Observe though that this time we get a randomized algorithm since we
use Lemma 5 which finds an -NE for zero sum games with high probability.
Theorem 4. There is a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds a
(0.6528 + )-WSNE using O(n·logn
2
) payoff queries.
3.3.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In this section we assume that Steps 1 through 4 of our algorithm did not return
a (2
3
− z)-WSNE, and that neither j∗ nor j′ contained a pure (2
3
− z)-WSNE.
We show that, under these assumptions, the rows b and s required by Step 5 do
indeed exist.
Probability bounds. We begin by proving bounds on the amount of proba-
bility that x∗ can place on S and B. The following lemma uses the fact that
x∗ secures an expected payoff of at least 2
3
− z to give an upper bound on the
amount of probability that x∗ can place on S. To simplify notation, we use Pr(B)
to denote the probability assigned by x∗ to the rows in B, and we use Pr(S) to
denote the probability assigned by x∗ to the rows in S.
Lemma 6. Pr(S) ≤ 1+3z
2−3z .
Proof. We will prove our claim using Markov’s inequality. Consider the random
variable T = 1 − Rij∗ where i is sampled from x∗. Since by our assumption the
expected payoff of the row player is greater than 2/3 − z we get that E(T ) ≤
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1/3 + z. If we apply Markov’s inequality we get
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) ≤ E(T )2
3
− z ≤
1 + 3z
2− 3z
which is the claimed result.
Next we show an upper bound on Pr(B). Here we use the fact that j∗ does not
contain a (2
3
− z)-WSNE to argue that all column player payoffs in B are smaller
than 1
3
+ z. Since we know that the payoff of j∗ against x∗ is at least 2
3
− z, this
can be used to prove a upper bound on the amount of probability that x∗ assigns
to B.
Lemma 7. Pr(B) ≤ 1+3z
2−3z .
Proof. Since there is no i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j∗) is a pure (2
3
− z)-WSNE ,
and since each row i ∈ B satisfies Rij∗ ≥ 13 + z, we must have that Cij∗ < 13 + z
for every i ∈ B. By assumption we know that CTj∗x∗ > 2/3− z. So, we have the
following inequality:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (1
3
+ z) +
(
1− Pr(B)) · 1.
Solving this inequality for Pr(B) gives the desired result.
Payoff inequalities for j∗. We now show properties about the average payoff
obtained from the rows in B and S. Recall that xb was defined in Step 4 of our
algorithm, and that it denotes the normalization of the probability mass assigned
by x∗ to rows in B. The following lemma shows that the expected payoff to the
row player in the strategy profile (xb, j
∗) is close to 1.
Lemma 8. We have (xb
T ·R)j∗ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof. By definition we have that:
(xb
T ·R)j∗ = 1
Pr(B)
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ . (3.1)
We begin by deriving a lower bound for
∑
i∈B x
∗
i · Rij∗ . Using the fact that x∗
secures an expected payoff of at least 2/3 − z against j∗ and then applying the
bound from Lemma 6 gives:
2
3
− z <
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · Pr(S)
≤
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
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Hence we can conclude that:∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ >
2
3
− z − 1
3
· (1 + 3z)
2
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
2− 3z .
Substituting this into Equation (3.1), along with the upper bound on Pr(B) from
Lemma 7, allows us to conclude that:
(xb
T ·R)j∗ ≥ 2− 3z
1 + 3z
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗
>
2− 3z
1 + 3z
· 1− 6z
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
Next we would like to show a similar bound on the expected payoff to the
column player of the rows in S. To do this, we define xs to be the normalisation
of the probability mass that x∗ assigns to the rows in S. More formally, for each
i ∈ [n], we define:
(xs)i =
{
1
Pr(S)
· x∗i if i ∈ S
0 otherwise.
The next lemma shows that the expected payoff to the column player in the
profile (xs, j
∗) is close to 1.
Lemma 9. We have (xs
T · C)j∗ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof. By definition we have that:
(xs
T · C)j∗ = 1
Pr(S)
·
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ . (3.2)
We begin by deriving a lower bound for
∑
i∈S x
∗
i · Cij∗ . By assumption, we know
that CTj∗x
∗ > 2/3 − z. Moreover, since j∗ does not contain a (2
3
− z)-WSNE we
have that all rows i in B satisfy Cij∗ < 1/3 − z. If we combine these facts that
with Lemma 7 we obtain:
2
3
− z <
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · Pr(B)
≤
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
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Hence we can conclude that:∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ >
2
3
− z − 1
3
· (1 + 3z)
2
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
2− 3z .
Substituting this into Equation (3.2), along with the upper bound on Pr(S) from
Lemma 7, allows us to conclude that:
(xb
T ·R)j∗ ≥ 2− 3z
1 + 3z
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗
>
2− 3z
1 + 3z
· 1− 6z
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
Payoff inequalities for j′. We now want to prove similar inequalities for the
column j′. The next lemma shows that the expected payoff for the column player
in the profile (xb, j
′) is close to 1. This is achieved by first showing a lower bound
on the payoff to the column player in the profile (xb, j
∗), and then using the fact
that j∗ is not a (2
3
− z)-best-response against xb, and that j′ is a best response
against xb.
Lemma 10. We have (xb
T · C)j′ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof. We first establish a lower bound on (xb
T · C)j∗ . By assumption, we know
that CTj∗x
∗ > 2/3 − z. Using this fact, along with the bounds from Lemmas 6
and 7 gives:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (xbT · C)j∗ + Pr(S) · 1
≤ 1 + 3z
2− 3z · (xb
T · C)j∗ + 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
Solving this inequality for (xb
T · C)j∗ yields:
(xb
T · C)j∗ > 1
3
· 1− 21z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
.
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Now we can prove the lower bound on (xb
T · C)j′ . Since j∗ is not a (23 − z)-
best-response against xb, and since j
′ is a best response against xb we obtain:
(xb
T · C)j′ > (xbT · C)j∗ + 2
3
− z
(xb
T · C)j′ > 1
3
· 1− 21z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
+
2
3
− z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
The only remaining inequality that we require is a lower bound on the expected
payoff to the row player in the profile (xs, j
′). However, before we can do this,
we must first prove an upper bound on the expected payoff to the row player in
(xb, j
′), which we do in the following lemma. Here we first prove that most of
the probability mass of xb is placed on rows i where Cij′ >
1
3
+ z, which when
combined with the fact that there is no i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j′) is a pure
(2
3
− z)-WSNE, is sufficient to provide an upper bound.
Lemma 11. We have (xb
T ·R)j′ < 13 · 1+33z+9z
2
1+3z
.
Proof. We begin by proving an upper bound on the amount of probability mass
assigned by xb to rows i with Cij′ <
1
3
+ z. Let T = 1−Cij′ be a random variable
where the row i is sampled according to xb. Lemma 10 implies that:
E[T ] = 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
Observe that Pr(T ≥ 1 − (1
3
+ z)) = Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) is equal to the amount
of probability that xb assigns to rows i with Cij′ <
1
3
+ z. Applying Markov’s
inequality then establishes our bound.
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) ≤
9z
1+3z
2
3
− z .
So, if p = 9z
(1+3z)(2/3−z) then we know that at least 1− p probability is assigned
by xb to rows i such that Cij′ >
1
3
+ z. Since we have assumed that there is no
i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j′) is a pure (2
3
− z)-WSNE, we know that any such row
i must satisfy Rij′ <
1
3
+ z. Hence, we obtain the following bound:
(xb
T ·R)j′ < (1− p) · (1
3
+ z) + p
=
1
3
· 1 + 33z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
.
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Finally, we show that the expected payoff to the row player in the profile
(xs, j
′) is close to 1. Here we use the fact that x∗ is a min-max strategy along
with the bound from Lemma 11 to prove our lower bound.
Lemma 12. We have (xs
T ·R)j′ > 1−15z1+3z .
Proof. Since x∗ is a min-max strategy that secures a value strictly larger than
2
3
− z, we have:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (xbT ·R)j′ + Pr(S) · (xsT ·R)j′ .
Substituting the bounds from Lemmas 6, 7, and 11 then gives:
2
3
− z < 1 + 3z
2− 3z ·
1
3
· 1 + 33z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
+
1 + 3z
2− 3z · (xs
T ·R)j′ .
Solving for (xs
T ·R)j′ then yields the desired result.
Finding rows b and s. So far, we have shown that the expected payoff to the
row player in (xb, j
∗) is close to 1, and that the expected payoff to the column
player in (xb, j
′) is close to 1. We now show that there exists a row b ∈ B such
that Rbj∗ is close to 1, and Cbj′ is close to 1, and that there exists a row s ∈ S
in which Csj∗ and Rsj′ are both close to 1. The following lemma uses Markov’s
inequality to show a pair of probability bounds that will be critical in showing
the existence of b.
Lemma 13. We have:
• xb assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with Rij∗ > 1− 18z1+3z .
• xb assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with Cij′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
Proof. We begin with the first case. Consider the random variable T = 1− Rij∗
where i is sampled from xb. By Lemma 8, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 18z
1+3z
whenever Rij∗ ≤ 1 − 18z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 18z
1 + 3z
) <
9z
1+3z
18z
1+3z
= 0.5.
The proof of the second case is identical to the proof given above, but uses
the (identical) bound from Lemma 10.
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The next lemma uses the same techniques to prove a pair of probability bounds
that will be used to prove the existence of s.
Lemma 14. We have:
• xs assigns strictly more than 13 probability to rows i with Cij∗ > 1− 27z1+3z .
• xs assigns strictly more than 23 probability to rows i with Rij′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
Proof. We begin with the first claim. Consider the random variable T = 1−Cij∗
where i is sampled from xs. By Lemma 9, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 27z
1+3z
whenever Cij∗ ≤ 1 − 27z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 27z
1 + 3z
) <
9z
1+3z
27z
1+3z
=
1
3
.
We now move on to the second claim. Consider the random variable T =
1−Rij∗ where i is sampled from xb. By Lemma 12, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 15z
1 + 3z
=
18z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 27z
1+3z
whenever Rij∗ ≤ 1 − 27z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 27z
1 + 3z
) <
18z
1+3z
27z
1+3z
=
2
3
.
Finally, we can formally prove the existence of b and s, which completes the
proof of correctness for our algorithm.
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by proving the first claim. If we sample a row b
randomly from xb, then Lemma 13 implies that probability that Rbj∗ ≤ 1− 18z1+3z
is strictly less than 0.5 and that the probability that Cbj′ ≤ 1 − 18z1+3z is strictly
less than 0.5. Hence, by the union bound, the probability that at least one of
these events occurs is strictly less than 1. So, there is a positive probability that
neither of the events occurs, which implies that there exists at least one row b
that satisfies the desired properties.
The second claim is proved using exactly the same technique, but using the
bounds from Lemma 14, again observing that the probability that a randomly
sampled row from xs satisfies the desired properties with positive probability.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
41
3.4 A Communication-Efficient Algorithm for Find-
ing a 0.5-WSNE in win-lose Bimatrix Games
The base algorithm (Algorithm 1) can be adapted to provide a communication
efficient method for finding a (0.5 + )-WSNE in win-lose games; bimatrix games
where all the payoff entries for the matrices R and C are 0 or 1. In brief, the
algorithm can be modified to find a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose game by making
Steps 2 and 3 check against the threshold of 0.5. It can then be shown that if
these steps fail, then there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in column j∗. This can
then be implemented as a communication efficient protocol using the algorithm
from Lemma 3.
Algorithm 3
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
• Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
• Let vr be the value secured by x∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 0.5, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj · x∗ ≤ 0.5, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
• Let j∗ be a pure best response to x∗.
• Find a row i such that Rij∗ = 1 and Cij = 1.
• Return (i, j∗).
We will show that this algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose game.
Firstly, we show that if the algorithm returns the strategy profile (i, j∗) in Step 4,
then this is a pure Nash equilibrium for (R,C). The following lemma is similar
to Lemma 1, but exploits the fact that the game is win-lose to obtain a stronger
conclusion.
Lemma 15. If Algorithm 3 is applied to a win-lose game, and it reaches Step 4,
then then there exists a row i ∈ supp(x∗) such that Rij∗ = 1 and Cij∗ = 1.
Proof. Let i be a row sampled from x∗. We will show that there is a positive
probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
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We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(Rij∗ = 0) < 0.5. Let the
random variable T = 1 − Rij∗ . Since vr > 12 , we have that E[T ] < 0.5. Thus,
applying Markov’s inequality we obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 1) ≤ E[T ]
1
< 0.5.
Since Pr(Rij∗ = 0) = Pr(T ≥ 1) we can therefore conclude that Pr(Rij∗ = 0) <
0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(Cij∗ = 0) < 0.5, by
using the fact that CTj∗ · x∗ > 0.5.
We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Pr(Rij∗ = 0 or Cij∗ = 0) < 1.
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies Rij∗ > 0 and Cij∗ > 0, so
such a row must exist. The final step is to observe that, since the game is win-lose,
we have that Rij∗ > 0 implies Rij∗ = 1, and that Cij∗ > 0 implies Cij∗ = 1.
We now prove that the algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE. The reasoning is
very similar to the analysis of the base algorithm. The strategy profiles returned
by Steps 2 and 3 are 0.5-WSNEs by the same reasoning that was given for the
base algorithm. Step 4 always returns a pure Nash equilibrium.
3.4.1 Communication Complexity of the Algorithm
We now show that Algorithm 3 can be implemented in a communication efficient
way.
The zero-sum games in Step 1 can be solved by the two players independently
without any communication. Then, the players exchange vr and vs using O(log n)
rounds of communication. If both vr and vs are smaller than 0.5, then the algo-
rithm from Lemma 3 is applied to communicate xˆs to the row player, and y
∗
s to
the column player. Since the payoffs under the sampled strategies are within 
of the originals, we have that all pure strategies have payoff less than or equal to
0.5 +  under (xˆs,y
∗
s), so this strategy profile is a (0.5 + )-WSNE.
We will assume from now on that vr > vc. If the algorithm reaches Step 3,
then the row player uses the algorithm of Lemma 3 to communicate x∗s to the
column player. The column player then computes a best response j∗s against x
∗
s,
and checks whether the payoff of j∗s against x
∗
s is less than or equal to 0.5 + . If
so, then the players output (x∗s, j
∗
s), which is a 0.5 + -WSNE
Otherwise, we claim that there is a pure strategy i ∈ supp(x∗s) such that (i, j∗s)
is a pure Nash equilibrium. This can be shown by observing that the expected
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payoff of x∗s against j
∗
s is at least 0.5 − , while the expected payoff of j∗s against
x∗s is at least 0.5 + . Repeating the proof of Lemma 15 using these inequalities
then shows that the pure Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. Since supp(x∗s)
has logarithmic size, the row player can simply transmit to the column player all
payoffs Rij∗s for which i ∈ supp(x∗s), and the column player can then send back a
row corresponding to a pure Nash equilibrium.
In conclusion, we have shown that a (0.5+ )-WSNE can be found in random-
ized expected-polynomial-time using O
(
log2 n
2
)
communication.
Theorem 5. For every win-lose game and every  > 0, there is a randomized
expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
2
)
communication and finds
a (0.5 + )-WSNE.
3.5 A Communication-Efficient Algorithm for
Finding a
(
3−√5
2 + 
)
-NE
We will study the following algorithm, which is inspired by the algorithm of
Bose, Byrka, and Markakis [7] and we will show that it finds a
(
3−√5
2
+ 
)
-NE in
a communication efficient way.
Algorithm 4
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
• Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
• Let vr be the value secured by x∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
• If vr ≤ 3−
√
5
2
, return (xˆ,y∗).
2. Otherwise:
• Let j be a best response for the column player against x∗.
• Let r be a best response for the row player against j.
• Define the strategy profile x′ = 1
2−vr · x∗ + 1−vr2−vr · r.
• Return (x′, j).
We show that this algorithm always produces a 3−
√
5
2
-NE. We start by con-
sidering the case the strategy profile by Step 1 is returned by our algorithm. The
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maximum payoff that the row player can achieve against y∗ is vr, so the row
player’s regret can be at most vr in the bimatrix game (R,C). This is because
the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is an NE for the zero-sum game (R,−R). So, X∗ is a
best response to y∗ and thus is a strategy that achieves the maximum payoff for
the row player against y∗. Similarly, the maximum payoff that the column player
can achieve against xˆ is vc ≤ vr, so the column player’s regret can be at most vr.
Step 1 only returns a strategy profile in the case where vr ≤ 3−
√
5
2
, so this step
always produces a 3−
√
5
2
-NE.
To analyse the quality of approximate equilibrium found by Step 2, we use
the following Lemma.
Lemma 16. The strategy profile (x′, j) is a 1−vr
2−vr -NE.
Proof. We start by analysing the regret of the row player. By definition, row
r is a best response against column j. So, the regret of the row player can be
expressed as:
Rrj − (x′ ·R)j = Rrj − 1
2− vR · ((x
∗)T ·R)j − 1− vR
2− vR ·Rrj
≤ 1
2− vR ·Rrj −
1
2− vR · vR
≤ 1
2− vR · 1−
1
2− vR · vr
=
1− vR
2− vR ,
where in the first inequality we use the fact that x∗ is a min-max strategy that
secures payoff at least vr, and the second inequality uses the fact that Rrj ≤ 1.
We now analyse the regret of the column player. Let c be a best response for
the column player against x′. The regret of the column player can be expressed
as:
((x′)T · C)c − ((x′)T · C)j
=
1
2− vR · ((x
∗)T · C)c + 1− vR
2− vR · Crc −
1
2− vR · ((x
∗)T · C)x∗j − 1− vR
2− vR · Crj
≤ 1− vR
2− vR · Crc −
1− vR
2− vR · Crj
≤ 1− vR
2− vR .
The first inequality holds since j is a best response against x∗, and therefore
((x∗)T · C)c ≤ ((x∗)T · C)j, and the second inequality holds since Crc ≤ 1 and
Crj ≥ 0. Thus, we have shown that both players have regret at most 1−vr2−vr under
(x′, j), and therefore (x′, j) is a 1−vr
2−vr -NE.
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Step 2 is only triggered in the case where vr >
3−√5
2
, and we have that 1−vr
2−vr =
3−√5
2
when vr =
3−√5
2
. Since 1−vr
2−vr decreases as vr increases, we therefore have
that Step 2 always produces a 3−
√
5
2
-NE. This completes the proof of correctness
for the algorithm.
3.5.1 Communication Complexity of the Algorithm
We now argue that, for every  > 0 the Algorithm 4 can be used to find a(
3−√5
2
+ 
)
-NE using O
(
log2 n
2
)
rounds of communication.
We begin by considering Step 1. Obviously, the zero-sum games can be solved
by the two players independently without any communication. Then, the players
exchange vr and vc using O(log n) rounds of communication. If both vr and vc are
smaller than 3−
√
5
2
, then the algorithm from Lemma 3 is applied to communicate
xˆs to the row player, and y
∗
s to the column player. Since the payoffs under
the sampled strategies are within  of the originals, we have that (xˆs,y
∗
s) is a(
3−√5
2
+ 
)
-NE.
If the algorithm reaches Step 2, then the row player uses the algorithm of
Lemma 3 to communicate x∗s to the column player. The column player then
computes a best response js against x
∗
s, and uses log n communication rounds to
transmit it to the row player. The row player then computes a best response rs
against js, then computes: x
′
s =
1
2−vr ·x∗s+ 1−vr2−vr ·r, and the players output (x′s, js).
To see that this produces a
(
3−√5
2
+ 
)
-NE, observe that x∗s secures a payoff of
at least vr −  for the row player, and repeating the proof of Lemma 16 with this
weaker inequality gives that this strategy profile is a
(
1−vr
2−vr + 
)
-NE.
Therefore, we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 6. For every  > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time
algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
2
)
communication and finds a
(
3−√5
2
+ 
)
-NE.
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Chapter 4
Computing Approximate Nash
Equilibria in Polymatrix Games
In this chapter, we present an algorithm that, for every δ in the range 0 < δ ≤ 0.5,
finds a (0.5 + δ)-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game in time polynomial in
the input size and 1
δ
.
This result is proven by adapting the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [66]
(henceforth referred to as the TS algorithm). They give a gradient descent algo-
rithm for finding a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. We generalise
their gradient descent techniques to the polymatrix setting, and show that it
always arrives at a (0.5 + δ)-Nash equilibrium after a polynomial number of iter-
ations.
4.1 Polymatrix games preliminaries
An n-player polymatrix game is defined by an undirected graph G = (V,E)
with n vertices, where every vertex corresponds to a player. The edges of the
graph specify which players interact with each other. For each i ∈ [n], we use
N(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} to denote the neighbors of player i. Each edge (i, j) ∈ E
specifies that a bimatrix game will be played between players i and j. Each
player i ∈ [n] has a fixed number of pure strategies mi, and the bimatrix game on
edge (i, j) ∈ E will therefore be specified by an mi ×mj matrix Aij, which gives
the payoffs for player i, and an mj ×mi matrix Aji, which gives the payoffs for
player j. Thus, on the edge (i, j) ∈ E the bimatrix game (Aij, Aji) is played. In
order to play the game, each player i chooses a strategy xi ∈ ∆mi and plays that
strategy simultaneously in all bimatrix games he participates in. The expected
payoff for a player is the sum of the expected payoffs over all the bimatrix games
he is involved. Formally, if X ∈ ∆ denotes a mixed strategy profile for the game,
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where X = (x1, . . . , xn) and ∆ = ∆m1 × . . . × ∆mn , then the payoff of player i
under X is
ui(X) := xTi
∑
j∈N(i)
Aijxj.
We denote by ui(x
′
i,X) the payoff for player i when he plays x′i and the other
players play according to the strategy profile X. Let vi(X) be the vector of
payoffs for each pure strategy of player i when the rest of players play strategy
profile X. Formally:
vi(X) =
∑
j∈N(i)
Aijxj.
For each vector x ∈ Rm, we define suppmax(x) to be the set of indices that achieve
the maximum of x, that is, we define suppmax(x) = {i ∈ [m] : xi ≥ xj,∀j ∈ [m]}.
Then the pure best responses of player i against a strategy profile X (where only
X−i is relevant) is given by:
Bri(X) = suppmax
 ∑
j∈N(i)
Aijxj
 = suppmax(vi(X)). (4.1)
The corresponding best response payoff is given by:
u∗i (X) = max
k∈mi
( ∑
j∈N(i)
Aijxj
)
k
 = maxk∈mi {(vi(X))k} . (4.2)
4.1.1 Payoff Normalisation
It is common, when proving results about additive notions of approximate equi-
libria, to rescale the payoffs of the game. This is necessary in order for different
results to be comparable. For example, all results about additive approximate
equilibria in bimatrix games assume that the payoff matrices have entries in the
range [0, 1], and therefore an -Nash equilibrium always has a consistent meaning.
For the same reason, we must rescale the payoffs in a polymatrix in order to give
a consistent meaning to an -approximation.
An initial, naive, approach would be to specify that each of the individual
bimatrix games has entries in the range [0, 1]. This would be sufficient if we were
only interested in polymatrix games played on either complete graphs or regular
graphs. However, in this model, if the players have differing degrees, then they
also have differing maximum payoffs. This means that an additive approximate
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equilibrium must pay more attention to high degree players, as they can have
larger regrets.
One solution to this problem is to apply degree based scaling, i.e. to rescale
according to the degree. That is, given a polymatrix game where each bimatrix
game has payoffs in the range [0, 1], if a player has degree d, then each of his
payoff matrices is divided by d. This transformation ensures that every player
has regret in the range [0, 1], and therefore low degree players are not treated
unfairly by additive approximations.
However, rescaling according to the degree assumes that each bimatrix game
actually uses the full range of payoffs in[0, 1]. In particular, some bimatrix games
may have minimum payoff strictly greater than 0, or maximum payoff strictly less
than 1. This issue arises, in particular, in our application of two-player Bayesian
games. Note that, unlike the case of a single bimatrix game, we cannot fix this
by rescaling individual bimatrix games in a polymatrix game, because we must
preserve the relationship between the payoffs in all of the bimatrix games that a
player is involved in.
To address this, we will rescale the games so that, for each player, the mini-
mum possible payoff is 0, and the maximum possible payoff is 1. For each player i,
we denote by Ui the maximum payoff he can obtain, and by Li the minimum pay-
off he can obtain. Formally:
Ui := max
p∈[mi]
 ∑
j∈N(i)
max
q∈[mj ]
(
Aij(p, q)
) ,
Li := min
p∈[mi]
 ∑
j∈N(i)
min
q∈[mj ]
(
Aij(p, q)
) .
Then, for all i and all j ∈ N(i) we will apply the following transformation, which
we call T (·), to all the entries z of payoff matrices Aij:
Ti(z) =
1
Ui − Li ·
(
z − Li
d(i)
)
.
Notice that in order the above normalisation to be well defined we need to assume
that Ui 6= Li. We argue that this is not a restriction to our normalisation. If
Ui = Li, then the player i gets the same payoff irrespectively from the strategy
profile played in the game, thus has regret zero. Hence, we can just do not
consider this player in the algorithm.
Observe that, since player i’s payoff is the sum of d(i) many bimatrix games,
it must be the case that after transforming the payoff matrices in this way, player
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i’s maximum possible payoff is 1, and player i’s minimum possible payoff is 0. In
what follows, when we study polymatrix games, we will assume that the payoff
matrices given by Aij are rescaled in this way.
It is worth noting that this rescaling is stronger than degree-based rescaling:
every -NE under this rescaling is also an -NE under the degree-based rescaling,
but the converse does not hold.
4.2 The TS Algorithm
The TS algorithm was proposed for computing -Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games. The algorithm starts from an arbitrary strategy profile X and uses a
gradient descent like approach which iteratively decreases the maximum regret a
player suffer.
In the TS algorithm, when each player has m pure strategies, a function
f : ∆m ×∆m → [0, 1] defined. The value of f under the strategy profile (x,y) is
equal to the maximum regret a player suffers. In each iteration of the algorithm
the value of the function f , i.e. the maximum regret the players suffer, strictly
decreases. Firstly, if the regrets the players suffer are not equal, then the algo-
rithm equalizes them by computing an appropriate strategy profile using a linear
program. Next, when the regrets are equal, the algorithm computes the direction
that the gradient of the function f is minimized, that is a strategy profile (x′,y′)
which specifies the direction that the regret decreases with the highest rate. Then
it produces a new profile by combining the strategy profiles (x,y) and (x′,y′).
The algorithm stops when it reaches a stationary point of the function f , i.e. a
strategy profile (x∗,y∗) such that the maximum regret the players suffer weakly
increases in every possible direction (x′,y′). This is a stationary point for the
regret function.
Given a stationary point (x∗,y∗) computed by the procedure described above,
the algorithm derives another two strategies (x˜, y˜) and (xˆ, yˆ) that depend on
(x∗,y∗) and the best responses of each player against this strategy profile. It
is proven that every time one of these three strategy profiles is a 0.3393-Nash
equilibrium.
4.3 The Descent Algorithm
As in TS, we define a function f that is equal to the maximum regret the players
suffer under a strategy profile and we apply the steepest descent method in order
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to compute an (approximate) stationary point of f .
In order to generalise the TS algorithm, we had to overcome several issues.
Firstly, the TS algorithm makes the regrets of the two players equal in every
iteration, but there is no obvious way to achieve this in the polymatrix setting.
Instead, we show how gradient descent can be applied to a strategy profile where
the regrets are not necessarily equal. Secondly, the output of the TS algorithm is
either a point found by gradient descent, or a point obtained by modifying the
result of gradient descent. In the polymatrix game setting, it is not immediately
obvious how such a modification can be derived with a non-constant number
of players (without an exponential blowup). Thus we apply a different analy-
sis, which proves that the point resulting from gradient descent always has our
approximation guarantee.
4.4 The Function f and -Nash Equilibria
As it is explained in Section 4.3, for the Descent algorithm we have to define
a function f : ∆ → [0, 1] that computes the maximum regret the players suffer
under any strategy profile X ∈ ∆.
The regret function fi : ∆→ [0, 1] is defined, for each player i, as follows:
fi(X) := u∗i (X)− ui(X). (4.3)
The maximum regret under a strategy profile X is given by the function f(X)
where:
f(X) := max{f1(X), . . . , fn(X)}. (4.4)
Notice that the value of f(X) is essentially the approximation guarantee of the
strategy profile X. Hence, X is an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE) if:
f(X) ≤ ,
and X is an exact Nash equilibrium if f(X) = 0.
4.5 The Gradient
The goal is to apply gradient descent to the regret function f . In this section,
we formally define the gradient of f in Definition 4, and give a combinatorial
version of that definition in Lemma 5. In order to show that our gradient descent
method terminates after a polynomial number of iterations, we actually need to
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use a slightly modified version, which we describe at the end of this section in
Definition 7.
Given a point X ∈ ∆, a feasible direction from X is defined by any other
point X′ ∈ ∆. This defines a line between X and X′, and formally speaking, the
direction of this line is X′ − X. In order to define the gradient of this direction,
we consider the function f((1 − ) · X +  · X′) − f(X) where  lies in the range
0 ≤  ≤ 1. The gradient of this direction is given in the following definition.
Definition 4. Given profiles X,X′ ∈ ∆ and  ∈ [0, 1], we define:
Df(X,X′, ) := f((1− ) · X+  · X′)− f(X).
Then, we define the gradient of f at X in the direction X′ − X as:
Df(X,X′) = lim
→0
1

Df(X,X′, ). (4.5)
The gradient of f at any point X ∈ ∆ along a feasible direction specified
by another point X′ ∈ ∆ provides the rate of decrease, or increase, of the value
of f along that direction. At any point X we wish to find the direction such
that f decreases with the highest rate, that is, we want to find the point X′
that minimizes Df(X,X′), and move along the direction X′ − X, or to find that
X is a stationary point, i.e. Df(X,X′) ≥ 0 for all X′ ∈ ∆. Unfortunately,
Equation (4.5) cannot be used directly in a combinatorial algorithm. Instead,
in Definition 5 we provide a combinatorial version of the gradient that allows
us to compute the steepest descent direction, with respect to the combinatorial
gradient, via a linear program.
The intuition for the combinatorial version comes from Equation (4.5). Let us
define X¯ := (1− ) ·X+  ·X′. From the natural gradient defined in Definition 4,
we get that:
Df(X,X′) = lim
→0
1

(
f(X¯)− f(X))
= lim
→0
1

(
max
i∈[n]
fi(X¯)− f(X)
)
= max
i∈[n]
(
lim
→0
1

(
fi(X¯)− f(X)
))
. (4.6)
In the Section 4.8.1 we study the limit lim→0 1
(
fi(X¯)− f(X)
)
, and we prove
that it is equal to the following combinatorial version. Before we state the result
we introduce some useful notation. Given profiles X and X′ let us denote:
Dfi(X,X′) = max
k∈Bri(X)
{(
vi(X′)
)
k
}− ui(xi,X′) + ui(xi − x′i,X). (4.7)
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The above expression arises from expanding fi(X¯)− f(X). The terms above are
all multiplied by  in the expansion, whereas the remaining terms all tend to zero
when the limit is taken. The following lemma is proved in the Section 4.8.1:
Lemma 17. Let X be strategy profile and i ∈ [n]. If fi(X) = f(X), then:
lim
→0
1

(
fi(X¯)− f(X)
)
= Dfi(X,X′)− f(X).
otherwise lim→0 1
(
fi(X¯)− f(X)
)
= −∞.
Combining Equation (4.6) with Lemma 17 gives the following combinatorial
version of the gradient that we will use throughout the rest of the chapter.
Definition 5 (Combinatorial gradient). The gradient of f at point X along di-
rection X′ − X is:
Df(X,X′) = max
i∈[n]
Dfi(X,X′)− f(X).
In order to show that our gradient descent algorithm terminates after a poly-
nomial number of steps, we have to use a slight modification of the formula given
in Definition 5. More precisely, in Dfi(X,X′), we need to take the maximum over
the δ-best responses, rather than the best responses.
We begin by providing the definition of the δ-best responses.
Definition 6 (δ-best response). Let X ∈ ∆, and let δ ∈ (0, 0.5]. The δ-best
response set Brδi (x) for player i ∈ [n] is defined as:
Brδi (x) :=
{
j ∈ [mi] :
(
vi(X)
)
j
≥ u∗i (X)− δ
}
.
We now define the function Df δi (X,X′).
Definition 7. Let X,X′ ∈ ∆, let  ∈ [0, 1], and let δ ∈ (0, 0.5]. We define
Df δi (X,X′) as:
Df δi (X,X′) := max
k∈Brδi (x)
{(
vi(X′)
)
k
}− ui(xi,X′)− ui(x′i,X) + ui(xi,X). (4.8)
Furthermore, we define Df δ(X,X′) as:
Df δ(X,X′) = max
i∈[n]
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X). (4.9)
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Our algorithm works by performing gradient descent using the function Df δ
as the gradient. Obviously, this is a different function to Df , and so we are not
actually performing gradient descent on the gradient of f . It is important to
note that all of our proofs are in terms of Df δ, and so this does not affect the
correctness of our algorithm. We prove Lemma 17 in order to explain where our
definition of the combinatorial gradient comes from, but the correctness of our
algorithm does not depend on the correctness of Lemma 17. Furthermore, we
will use some of the techniques used in the proof of Lemma 17 in order to prove
the running time of our algorithm.
4.6 The Algorithm
In this section, we describe our algorithm for finding a (0.5+ δ)-Nash equilibrium
in a polymatrix game by gradient descent. In each iteration of the algorithm, we
must find the direction of steepest descent with respect to Df δ.
The direction of steepest descent. We show that the direction of steepest
descent can be found by solving a linear program. Our goal is, for a given strat-
egy profile X, to find another strategy profile X′ so as to minimize the gradient
Df δ(X,X′). Recall that Df δ is defined in Equation (4.9) to be:
Df δ(X,X′) = max
i∈[n]
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X).
Note that the term f(X) is a constant with respect to X′ in this expression,
because it is the same for all directions X′. Thus, it is sufficient to formulate a
linear program in order to find the X′ that minimizes maxi∈[n] Df δi (X,X′). Using
the definition of Df δi in Equation (4.8), we can do this as follows.
Definition 8 (Steepest descent linear program). Given a strategy profile X, the
steepest descent linear program is defined as follows. Find X′ ∈ ∆, l1, l2, . . . , ln,
and w such that:
minimize w
subject to
(
vi(X′)
)
k
≤ li ∀k ∈ Brδi (x), ∀i ∈ [n]
li − ui(xi,X′)− ui(x′i,X) + ui(X) ≤ w ∀i ∈ [n]
X′ ∈ ∆.
The li variables deal with the maximum in the term maxk∈Brδi (x)
{(
vi(X′)
)
k
}
,
while the variable w is used to deal with the maximum over the functions Df δi .
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Since the constraints of the linear program correspond precisely to the definition of
Df δ, it is clear that, when we minimize w, the resulting X′ specifies the direction
of steepest descent. For each profile X, we define Q(X) to be the direction X′
found by the steepest descent LP for X.
Once we have found the direction of steepest descent, we then need to move
in that direction. More precisely, we fix a parameter δ and we define  = δ
δ+2
which is used to determine how far we move in the steepest descent direction.
The choice of this value for  ensures that in every iteration of our algorithm the
value of f is decreasing and moreover, as we will show in Section 4.8, leads to a
polynomial bound on the running time of our algorithm.
The algorithm. We can now formally describe our algorithm. The algorithm
takes a parameter δ ∈ (0, 0.5], which will be used as a tradeoff between running
time and the quality of approximation.
Descent algorithm
1. Choose an arbitrary strategy profile X ∈ ∆.
2. Solve the steepest descent linear program with input X to obtain X′ =
Q(X).
3. Set X := X+ (X′ − X), where  = δ
δ+2
.
4. If f(X) ≤ 0.5 + δ then stop, otherwise go to step 2.
A single iteration of this algorithm corresponds to executing steps 2, 3, and
4. Since this only involves solving a single linear program, it is clear that each
iteration can be completed in polynomial time.
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to showing the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 finds a (0.5 + δ)-NE after at most O( 1
δ2
) iterations.
To prove Theorem 7, we will show two properties. Firstly, in Section 4.7, we
show that our gradient descent algorithm never gets stuck in a stationary point
before it finds a (0.5 + δ)-NE. To do so, we define the notion of a δ-stationary
point, and we show that every δ-stationary point is at least a (0.5 + δ)-NE, which
then directly implies that the gradient descent algorithm will not get stuck before
it finds a (0.5 + δ)-NE.
Secondly, in Section 4.8, we prove the upper bound on the number of itera-
tions. To do this we show that, if an iteration of the algorithm starts at a point
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that is not a δ-stationary point, then that iteration will make a large enough
amount of progress. This then allows us to show that the algorithm will find a
(0.5 + δ)-NE after O( 1
δ2
) many iterations, and therefore the overall running time
of the algorithm is polynomial.
4.7 Stationary Points of f
Recall that Definition 8 gives a linear program for finding the direction X′ that
minimises Df δ(X,X′). Our steepest descent procedure is able to make progress
whenever this gradient is negative, and so a stationary point is any point X for
which Df δ(X,X′) ≥ 0 for every X′. In fact, our analysis requires us to consider
δ-stationary points, which we now define.
Definition 9 (δ-stationary point). Let X∗ be a mixed strategy profile, and let
δ > 0. We have that X∗ is a δ-stationary point if for all X′ ∈ ∆:
Df δ(X∗,X′) ≥ −δ.
We now show that every δ-stationary point of f(X) is a (0.5 + δ)-NE. Recall
from Definition 7 that:
Df δ(X,X′) = max
i∈[n]
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X).
Therefore, if X∗ is a δ-stationary point, we must have, for every direction X′:
f(X∗) ≤ max
i∈[n]
Df δi (X∗,X′) + δ. (4.10)
Since f(X∗) is the maximum regret under the strategy profile X∗, in order to
show that X∗ is a (0.5 + δ)-NE, we only have to find some direction X′ such that
maxi∈[n] Df δi (X∗,X′) ≤ 0.5. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 18. For every point X, there exists a direction X′ such that:
max
i∈[n]
Df δi (X,X′) ≤ 0.5.
Proof. First, define X¯ to be a strategy profile in which each player i ∈ [n] plays
a best response against X. We will set X′ = X¯+X
2
. Then for each i ∈ [n], we have
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that Df δi (X,X′), is less than or equal to:
max
k∈Brδi (X)
{(
vi(
X¯+ X
2
)
)
k
}
− ui(xi, X¯+ X
2
)− ui( x¯i + xi
2
,X) + ui(xi,X)
=
1
2
· max
k∈Brδi (X)
{(
vi(X¯+ X)
)
k
}− 1
2
· ui(xi, X¯)− 1
2
· ui(x¯i,X)
≤ 1
2
·
(
max
k∈Brδi (X)
{(
vi(X¯)
)
k
}
+ max
k∈Brδi (X)
{(
vi(X)
)
k
}− ui(xi, X¯)− ui(x¯i,X))
=
1
2
·
(
max
k∈Brδi (X)
{(
vi(X¯)
)
k
}− ui(xi, X¯)) because x¯i is a b.r. to x
≤ 1
2
· max
k∈Brδi (X)
{(
vi(X¯)
)
k
}
≤ 1
2
.
Thus, the point X′ satisfies maxi∈[n] Df δi (X,X′) ≤ 0.5.
We can sum up the results of the section in the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Every δ-stationary point X∗ is a (0.5 + δ)-Nash equilibrium.
4.8 Time Complexity of the Algorithm
In this section, we show that Algorithm 1 terminates after a polynomial number
of iterations. Let X be a strategy profile that is considered by Algorithm 1, and
let X′ = Q(X) be the solution of the steepest descent LP for X. These two profiles
will be fixed throughout this section.
We begin by proving a technical lemma that will be crucial for showing our
bound on the number of iterations. To simplify our notation, throughout this
section we define fnew := f(X + (X′ − X)) and f := f(X). Furthermore, we
define D = maxi∈[n] Df δi (X,X′). The following lemma, which is proved in Sub-
section 4.8.2, gives a relationship between f and fnew.
Lemma 20. In every iteration of Algorithm 1 we have:
fnew − f ≤ (D − f) + 2(1−D). (4.11)
In the next lemma we prove that, if we are not in a δ-stationary point, then
we have a bound on the amount of progress made in each iteration. We use this
in order to bound the number of iterations needed before we reach a point X
where f(X) ≤ 0.5 + δ.
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Lemma 21. Fix  = δ
δ+2
, where 0 < δ ≤ 0.5. Either X is a δ-stationary point
or:
fnew ≤
(
1−
(
δ
δ + 2
)2)
f. (4.12)
Proof. Recall that by Lemma 20 the gain in every iteration of the steepest descent
is:
fnew − f ≤ (D − f) + 2(1−D). (4.13)
We consider the following two cases:
a) D − f > −δ. Then, by definition, we are in a δ-stationary point.
b) D − f ≤ −δ. We have set  = δ
δ+2
. If we solve for δ we get that δ = 2
1− .
Since D − f ≤ −δ, we have that (D − f)(1− ) ≤ −2. Thus we have:
(D − f)(− 1) ≥ 2
0 ≥ (D − f)(1− ) + 2
0 ≥ (D − f) + (2−D + f)
−f −  ≥ (D − f) + (1−D) ( ≥ 0)
−2f − 2 ≥ (D − f) + 2(1−D).
Thus, since 2 ≥ 0 we get:
−2f ≥ (D − f) + 2(1−D)
≥ fnew − f According to (4.13).
Thus we have shown that:
fnew − f ≤− 2f
fnew ≤(1− 2)f.
Finally, using the fact that  = δ
δ+2
, we get that
fnew ≤
(
1−
(
δ
δ + 2
)2)
f.
So, when the algorithm has not reached yet a δ-stationary point, there is a
decrease on the value of f that is at least as large as the bound specified in (4.12)
in every iteration of the gradient descent procedure. In the following lemma we
prove that after O( 1
δ2
) iterations of the steepest descent procedure the algorithm
finds a point X where f(X) ≤ 0.5 + δ.
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Lemma 22. After O( 1
δ2
) iterations of the steepest descent procedure the algorithm
finds a point X where f(X) ≤ 0.5 + δ.
Proof. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xk be the sequence of strategy profiles that are considered
by Algorithm 1. Since the algorithm terminates as soon as it finds a (0.5+δ)-NE,
we have f(Xi) > 0.5 + δ for every i < k. Therefore, for each i < k we we can
apply Lemma 19 to argue that Xi is not a δ-stationary point, which then allows
us to apply Lemma 21 to obtain:
f(Xi+1) ≤
(
1−
(
δ
δ + 2
)2)
f(Xi).
So, the amount of progress made by the algorithm in iteration i is:
f(Xi)− f(Xi+1) ≥ f(Xi)−
(
1−
(
δ
δ + 2
)2)
f(Xi)
=
(
δ
δ + 2
)2
f(Xi)
>
(
δ
δ + 2
)2
· 0.5.
Thus, each iteration of the algorithm decreases the regret by at least ( δ
δ+2
)2 · 0.5.
The algorithm starts at a point X1 with f(X1) ≤ 1, and terminates when it
reaches a point Xk with f(Xk) ≤ 0.5 + δ. Thus the total amount of progress
made over all iterations of the algorithm can be at most 1− (0.5 + δ). Therefore,
the number of iterations used by the algorithm can be at most:
1− (0.5 + δ)(
δ
δ+2
)2 · 0.5 ≤ 1− 0.5( δ
δ+2
)2 · 0.5
=
(δ + 2)2
δ2
=
δ2
δ2
+
4δ
δ2
+
4
δ2
.
Since δ < 1, we have that the algorithm terminates after at most O( 1
δ2
) iterations.
Lemma 22 implies that that after polynomially many iterations the algorithm
finds a point such that f(X) ≤ 0.5 + δ, and by definition such a point is a
(0.5 + δ)-NE. Thus we have completed the proof of Theorem 7.
59
4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 17
Before we begin with the proof, we introduce the following notation. For a player
i ∈ [n], given a strategy profile X and a subset of i’s pure strategies S ⊆ [mi], we
use Mi(X, S) for taking the maximum of the payoffs of i when the others play
according to X, and player i is restricted to pick elements from S:
Mi(X, S) := max
k∈S
(
vi(X)
)
k
.
In order to find the gradient, we have to calculate the variation of fi along
the direction X′ − X, by evaluating f(X¯) for points X¯ of the form
X¯ := X+ (X′ − X) = (1− ) · X+  · X′.
Recall from (4.3), that for X¯ ∈ ∆ we have that fi(X¯) := u∗i (X¯)− ui(X¯). In order
to rewrite u∗i (X¯) we introduce notation Λi(X,X′, ) as follows.
Definition 10. Given (X,X′, ) and S = Bri(X) we define Λi(X,X′, ) as:
Λi(X,X′, ) := max
{
0,max
k∈S¯
{(vi(X¯))k} −max
l∈S
{(vi(X¯))l}
}
. (4.14)
In the following technical lemma we provide an expression for u∗i (X¯). In order
to rewrite u∗i (X¯), we use the following simple observation. Consider a multiset of
numbers {a1, . . . , an}, and the index sets S ⊆ [n] and S¯ = [n] \ S. We have the
following identity:
max{a1, . . . , an} ≡ max
j∈S
{aj}+ max
{
0, max
k∈S¯
{ak} −max
j∈S
{aj}
}
. (4.15)
In the following lemma, we use this identity with S = Bri(X) to rewrite u∗i (X¯).
We use this particular expression for u∗i (X¯)) because it helps us to compute
the limit when  tends to zero. Moreover, the values Λi(X,X′, ) will be used in
order to derive the value of  that it is used in our algorithm.
Lemma 23. Given profiles X and X′ in ∆ and a player i ∈ [n], let S = Bri(X).
We have:
u∗i ((1− ) · X+  · X′)) = (1− ) ·Mi(X, S) +  ·Mi(X′, S) + Λi(X,X′, ).
(4.16)
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Proof.
u∗i (X¯) = u∗i ((1− ) · X+  · X′))
= max
k∈[mi]
{(
vi(X+ (X′ − X))
)
k
}
By (4.2)
= max
k∈S
{(
vi(X+ (X′ − X))
)
k
}
+ Λi(X,X′, ) By (4.15) and (4.14)
= max
k∈S
{(
(1− ) · vi(X) +  · vi(X′)
)
k
}
+ Λi(X,X′, ).
Since S = Bri(X), we know that for all k ∈ S we have that (vi(X))k are equal, so
we have the following:
max
k∈S
{(
(1− ) · vi(X) +  · vi(X′)
)
k
}
= max
k∈S
{(
(1− ) · vi(X)
)
k
}
+ max
k∈S
{(
 · vi(X′)
)
k
}
= (1− ) ·Mi(X, S) +  ·Mi(X′, S)
and we get the claimed result.
We will use the expression (4.16) for u∗i (X¯), along with the following reformu-
lation of ui(X¯):
ui(X¯) = ui(X+ (X′ − X))
= ui(xi + (x
′
i − xi),X+ (X′ − X))
= ui(xi,X) +  · ui(xi,X′ − X) +  · ui(x′i − xi,X) + 2 · ui(x′i − xi,X′ − X)
= ui(X) +  · ui(xi,X′)−  · ui(xi,X) +  · ui(x′i,X) +  · ui(xi,X)− 2 · ui(X′ − X)
= (1− ) · ui(X) + 
(
ui(xi,X′) + ui(x′i,X)− ui(X)
)
+ 2 · ui(X′ − X). (4.17)
We now use these reformulations to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 24. We have that fi(X¯)− f(X) is equal to:

(
Dfi(X,X′)− f(X)
)
+ Λi(X,X′, )− 2ui(X′−X)− (1− ) max
j∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
}
.
Proof. Recall that S = Bri(X). For a given i ∈ [n], using Lemma 23 and the
reformulation for ui(X¯), we have:
fi(X¯)− f(X) = u∗i (X¯)− ui(X¯)− f(X)
= (1− ) ·Mi(X, S) +  ·Mi(X′, S) + Λi(X,X′, )
− (1− )ui(X) + 
(−ui(xi,X′)− ui(x′i,X) + ui(X))− 2ui(X′ − X)− f(X).
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Recall from (4.3) that fi(X) = Mi(X, S) − ui(X), so the formula above is equal
to:

(
Mi(X′, S)−ui(xi,X′)−ui(x′i,X)+ui(X)
)
+Λi(X,X′, )−2ui(X′−X)+(1−)fi(X)−f(X).
Now we can use (4.7) for Dfi(X,X′) so that the above formula becomes:
 ·Dfi(X,X′) + Λi(X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X) + (1− )fi(X)− f(X) =
 ·Dfi(X,X′) + Λi(X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X) + (1− )fi(X)− (1− )f(X)− f(X) =

(
Dfi(X,X′)− f(X)
)
+ Λi(X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X)− (1− )
(
f(X)− fi(X)
)
.
Recall now that f(X) = maxj∈[n] fj(X). Thus the term f(X) − fi(X) can be
written as maxj∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
}
. So, the expression above is equivalent to:

(
Dfi(X,X′)− f(X)
)
+ Λi(X,X′, )− 2ui(X′−X)− (1− ) max
j∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
}
.
We will now use Lemma 24 to study the limit lim→0(fi(X¯) − f(X)
)
for all
i ∈ [n]. Firstly, we deal with Λ(X,X′, ). It is easy to see that lim→0
(
X+ (X′ −
X)
)
= X. Then, when S = Bri(X) we have that:
lim
→0
(
max
k∈S¯
{(vi(X¯))k} −max
l∈S
{(vi(X¯))l}
)
< 0.
This is true from the definition of pure best response strategies. So, from Equation
(4.14) for Λi(X,X′, ) it is true that lim→0 Λi(X,X′, ) = 0.
Furthermore, the term 2·ui(X′−X) when is divided by  equals to ·ui(X′−X),
thus lim→0
(
 · ui(X′ − X)
)
= 0.
Moreover, the term:
lim
→0
(
−1− 

·max
j∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
})
is either 0 when fi(X) = f(X), i.e player i has the maximum regret and maxj∈[n]
{
fj(X)−
fi(X)
}
= 0, or −∞ otherwise, because maxj∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
}
> 0.
To sum up, if fi(X) achieves the maximum regret at point X′, then the limit
lim→0
(
fi(X¯)− f(X)
)
= Dfi(X,X′)− f(X), otherwise the limit equals −∞. This
completes the proof of Lemma 17.
62
4.8.2 Proof of Lemma 20
Throughout this proof, X,X′, X¯, and  will be fixed as they are defined in Sec-
tion 4.8. In order to prove this lemma, we must show a bound on:
f(X¯)− f(X) = max
i∈[n]
fi(X¯)− f(X).
Before we start the analysis we need to redefine the term Λδi (X,X′, ) in order
to prove an analogous version of Lemma 23 when δ-best responses are used.
Definition 11. We define Λδi (X,X′, ) as:
Λδi (X,X′, ) := max
{
0, max
k∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X¯))k} − max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X¯))l}
}
. (4.18)
We now use this definition to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 25. We have:
u∗i ((1− ) · X+  · X′)) ≤ (1− ) max
k∈Brδi (x)
(
vi(X))k +  max
k∈Brδi (x)
(vi(X′)
)
k
+ Λδi (X,X′, ).
(4.19)
Proof. We have:
u∗i ((1− ) · X+  · X′)) = max
k∈[mi]
(
vi((1− ) · X+  · X′)
)
k
= max
k∈Brδi (x)
(
vi((1− ) · X+  · X′)
)
k
+ Λδi (X,X′, ) Using (4.15)
≤ (1− ) max
k∈Brδi (x)
(
vi(X)
)
k
+  max
k∈Brδi (x)
(
vi(X′)
)
k
+ Λδi (X,X′, ).
We will use the reformulation from Equation (4.17) for ui(X¯):
ui(X¯) = (1− ) · ui(X) + 
(
ui(xi,X′) + ui(x′i,X)− ui(X)
)
+ 2 · ui(X′ − X).
(4.20)
The correctness of this was proved in Section 4.8.1. Now we use all the these
reformulations in order to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 26. We have that fi(X¯)− f(X) is less than or equal to:

(
Df δi (X,X′)−f(X)
)
+Λδi (X,X′, )−2ui(X′−X)−(1−) max
j∈[n]
{fj − fi} . (4.21)
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Proof. Recall that, by definition, we have that:
fi(X¯) = u∗i (X¯)− ui(X¯).
Thus, we can apply Lemma 25 along with the reformulation given in Equa-
tion (4.20) for ui(X¯) to prove that fi(X¯)− f(X) is less than or equal to:
(1− ) max
k∈Brδi (x)
(
vi(X))k +  max
k∈Brδi (x)
(vi(X′)
)
k
+ Λδi (X,X′, )
− (1− )ui(X) + 
(−ui(xi,X′)− ui(x′i,X) + ui(X))− 2ui(X′ − X)− f(X).
We can now use the fact that maxk∈Brδi (x)
(
vi(X)
)
k
−ui(X) = fi(X) and the defini-
tion of Df δi (X,X′) given in (4.8) to prove that the expression above is equivalent
to:
 ·Df δi (X,X′) + Λδi (X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X) + (1− )fi(X)− f(X)
=  ·Df δi (X,X′) + Λδi (X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X) + (1− )fi(X)− (1− )f(X)− f(X)
= 
(
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X)
)
+ Λδi (X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X)− (1− )
(
f(X)− fi(X)
)
= 
(
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X)
)
+ Λδi (X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X)− (1− ) max
j∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
}
.
This completes the proof.
Having shown Lemma 26, we will now study each term of (4.21) and provide
bounds for each of them. To begin with, it is easy to see that for all i ∈ [n]
we have that maxj∈[n]
{
fj(X) − fi(X)
} ≥ 0, and since  < 1, we have that (1 −
) maxj∈[n]
{
fj(X)− fi(X)
} ≥ 0. Thus, Equation (4.21) is less than or equal to:

(
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X)
)
+ Λδi (X,X′, )− 2ui(X′ − X). (4.22)
Next we consider the term Λδi (X,X′, ). In the following technical lemma we
prove that Λδi (X,X′, ) = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Lemma 27. We have Λδi (X,X′, ) = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. According to equation (4.18) for Λδi (X,X′, ), we have:
Λδi (X,X′, ) = max
{
0, max
k∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X¯))k} − max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X¯))l}
}
.
We can rewrite this expression as follows. First define:
Z(X,X′, , k) = (vi(X¯))k − max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X¯))l}.
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Then we have:
Λδi (X,X′, ) = max
{
0, max
k∈Brδi (x)
{
Z(X,X′, , k)
}}
.
Our goal is to show that, for our chosen value of , we have Λδi (X,X′, ) = 0. For
this to be the case, we must have that Z(X,X′, , k) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ Brδi (x). In
the rest of this proof, we will show that this is indeed the case.
By definition, we have that:
(vi(X¯))k =
(
vi(X) + (vi(X′)− vi(X))
)
k
. (4.23)
The term maxl∈Brδi (x){(vi(X¯))l} can be written as follows:
max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi((1− )X+ X′))l} ≥ max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi((1− )X))l}
= (1− ) · max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l}
= max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l} −  · max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l}. (4.24)
We now substitute these two bounds into the definition of Z(X,X′, , k). We have:
Z(X,X′, , k) ≤ vi(X)k− max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l}+
(
vi(X′)k−vi(X)k+ max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l}
)
.
(4.25)
From the definition of δ-best responses (Definition 6), we know that for all k ∈
Brδi (x):
vi(X)k − max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l} < −δ.
Furthermore, since we know that the maximum payoff for player i ∈ [n] is 1, we
have the following trivial bound for all k ∈ Brδi (x):
vi(X′)k − vi(X)k + max
l∈Brδi (x)
{(vi(X))l} ≤ 2.
Substituting these two bounds into Equation (4.25) gives, for all k ∈ Brδi (x):
Z(X,X′, , k) ≤ −δ +  · 2.
Thus, for each k ∈ Brδi (x), we have that Z(X,X′, , k) ≤ 0 whenever:
−δ +  · 2 ≤ 0,
and this is equivalent to:
 ≤ δ
2
.
This inequality holds by the definition of , so we have Z(X,X′, , k) ≤ 0 for all
k ∈ Brδi (x), which then implies that Λδi (X,X′, ) ≤ 0.
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Next we consider the term ui(X′−X) in Equation (4.22). The following lemma
provides a simple lower bound for this term.
Lemma 28. For all i ∈ [n], we have Df δi (X,X′)− 1 ≤ ui(X′ − X).
Proof. For ui(X′ − X) we have the following:
ui(X′ − X) = ui(x′i − xi,X′ − X)
= ui(x
′
i,X′ − X)− ui(xi,X′ − X)
= ui(x
′
i,X′)− ui(x′i,X)− ui(xi,X′) + ui(xi,X). (4.26)
Recall from (4.8) that:
Df δi (X,X′) = max
k∈Brδi (x)
{(
vi(X′)
)
k
}− ui(xi,X′)− ui(x′i,X) + ui(xi,X).
We can see that (4.26) and (4.8) differ only in terms ui(x
′
i,X′) and maxk∈Brδi (x)
{(
vi(X′)
)
k
}
respectively. We know that maxk∈Brδi (x)
{(
vi(X′)
)
k
} ≤ 1. Then, we can see that
Df δi (X,X′)− 1 ≤ ui(X′ − X).
Recall that D = maxi∈[n] Df δi (X,X′) and fnew = f(X¯) and f = f(X). We
can now apply the bounds from Lemma 27 and Lemma 28 to Equation (4.22) to
obtain:
fnew − f ≤ max
i∈[n]
{

(
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X)
)− 2(Df δi (X,X′)− 1)}
≤ max
i∈[n]
{

(
Df δi (X,X′)− f(X)
)− 2(D − 1)}
= (D − f) + 2(1−D).
This completes the proof of Lemma 20.
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4.9 Open Questions
We have presented a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a (0.5 + δ)-Nash equi-
librium of a polymatrix game for any δ > 0. Recently it was shown [31] that
the performance guarantee that Tsaknakis and Spirakis proved for their algo-
rithm [66] is almost tight. An empirical study of our algorithm [23] showed that
Descent is fast and computes approximate Nash equilibria with very good accu-
racy far away from its theoretical guarantee. Though we do not have examples
that show that the approximation guarantee is tight for our algorithm, we do not
see an obvious approach to prove a better guarantee. The initial choice of strategy
profile affects our algorithm, and it is conceivable that one may be able to start
the algorithm from an efficiently computable profile with certain properties that
allow a better approximation guarantee. One natural special case is when there is
a constant number of players, which may allow one to derive new strategy profiles
from a stationary point as done by Tsaknakis and Sprirakis [66]. It may also be
possible to develop new techniques when the number of pure strategies available
to the players is constant, or when the structure of the graph is restricted in
some way. For example, in the games arising from two-player Bayesian games,
the graph is always bipartite.
In this chapter we considered -Nash equilibria, which are the most well-
studied type of approximate equilibria. However, -Nash equilibria have a draw-
back: since they only require that the expected payoff is within  of a pure best
response, it is possible that a player could be required to place probability on
a strategy that is arbitrarily far from being a best response. Note, it has been
shown that there is a PTAS for finding -WSNE of bimatrix games if and only
if there is a PTAS for -Nash [18, 12]. For n-player games with n > 2 there has
been very little work on developing algorithms for finding -WSNE. This is a very
interesting direction, both in general and when n > 2 is a constant.
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Chapter 5
Approximate Equilibria in Two
Player Bayesian Games
In this Chapter, we define two-player Bayesian games, and show how our al-
gorithm can be applied in order to efficiently find a (0.5 + δ)-Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. A two-player Bayesian game is played between a row player and a
column player. Each player has a set of possible types, and at the start of the
game, each player is assigned a type by drawing from a known joint probability
distribution. Each player learns his type, but not the type of his opponent. Our
task is to find an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
We show that this can be reduced to the problem of finding an -NE in a
polymatrix game, and therefore our algorithm from Chapter 4 can be used to
efficiently find a (0.5 + δ)-BNE of a two-player Bayesian game.
5.1 Two player Bayesian games preliminaries
Payoff matrices. We will use k1 to denote the number of pure strategies of the
row player and k2 to denote the number of pure strategies of the column player.
Furthermore, we will use m to denote the number of types of the row player, and
n to denote the number of types of the column player.
For each pair of types i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n], there is a k1 × k2 bimatrix game
(R,C)ij := (Rij, Cij) that is played when the row player has type i and the
column player has type j. We assume that all payoffs in every matrix Rij and
every matrix Cij lie in the range [0, 1].
Types. The distribution over types is specified by a joint probability distribu-
tion: for each pair of types i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n], the probability that the row
player is assigned type i and the column player is assigned type j is given by pij.
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Obviously, we have that:
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pij = 1.
We also define some useful shorthands: for all i ∈ [m] we denote by pRi (pCj ) the
probability that row (column) player has type i ∈ [m] (j ∈ [n]). Formally:
pRi =
n∑
j=1
pij for all i ∈ [m],
pCj =
m∑
i=1
pij for all j ∈ [n].
Note that
∑m
i=1 p
R
i =
∑n
j=1 p
C
j = 1. Furthermore, we denote by p
R
i (j) the condi-
tional probability that type j ∈ [n] will be chosen for column player given that
type i is chosen for row player. Similarly, we define pCj (i) for the column player.
Formally:
pRi (j) =
pij
pRi
for all i ∈ [m],
pCj (i) =
pij
pCj
for all j ∈ [n].
We can see that for given type t = (i, j) we have that pij = p
R
i ·pRi (j) = pCj ·pCj (i).
Strategies. In order to play a Bayesian game, each player must specify a strat-
egy for each of their types. Thus, a strategy profile is a pair (x,y), where
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) such that each xi ∈ ∆k1 , and where y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) such
that each yi ∈ ∆k2 . This means that, when the row player gets type i ∈ [m] and
the column player gets type j ∈ [n], then the game (Rij, Cij) will be played, and
the row player will use strategy xi while the column player will use strategy yj.
Given a strategy profile (x,y), we can define the expected payoff to both
players (recall that the players are not told their opponent’s type).
Definition 12 (Expected payoff). Given a strategy profile (x,y) and a type t =
(i, j), the expected payoff for the row player is given by:
uR(xi,y) =
n∑
j=1
pRi (j) · xTi Rijyj,
= xTi
n∑
j=1
pRi (j) ·Rijyj.
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Similarly, for the column player the expected payoff is:
uC(x, yj) = y
T
j
m∑
i=1
pCj (i) · CTijxi.
Rescaling. Before we define approximate equilibria for two-player Bayesian
games, we first rescale the payoffs. Much like for polymatrix games, rescaling is
needed to ensure that an -approximate equilibrium has a consistent meaning.
Our rescaling will ensure that, for every possible pair of types, both player’s
expected payoff uses the entire range [0, 1].
For each type i of the row player, we use U iR to denote the maximum expected
payoff for the row player when he has type i, and we use LiR to denote the
minimum expected payoff for the row player when he has type i. Formally, these
are defined to be:
U iR = max
a∈[k1]
n∑
j=1
max
b∈[k2]
(
pRi (j) ·Rij
)
a,b
,
LiR = min
a∈[k1]
n∑
j=1
min
b∈[k2]
(
pRi (j) ·Rij
)
a,b
.
Then we apply the transformation T iR(·) to every element z of Rij, for all types j
of the column player, where:
T iR(z) :=
1
U iR − LiR
·
(
z − L
i
R
n
)
. (5.1)
Similarly, we transform all payoff matrices for the column player using:
T jC(z) :=
1
U jC − LjC
·
(
z − L
j
C
m
)
, (5.2)
where U jC and L
j
C are defined symmetrically. Note that, after this transformation
has been applied, both player’s expected payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. Moreover,
the full range is used: there exists a strategy for the column player against which
one of the row player’s strategies has expected payoff 1, and there exists a strategy
for the column player against which one of the row player’s strategies has expected
payoff 0. From now on we will assume that the payoff matrices have been rescaled
in this way.
We can now define approximate Bayesian Nash equilibria for a two-player
Bayesian game.
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Definition 13 (Approximate Bayes Nash Equilibrium (-BNE)). Let (x,y) be a
strategy profile. The profile (x,y) is an -BNE iff the following conditions hold:
uR(xi,y) ≥ uR(x′i,y)−  for all x′i ∈ ∆k1 for all i ∈ [m], (5.3)
uC(x, yj) ≥ uC(x, y′j)−  for all y′j ∈ ∆k2 for all j ∈ [n]. (5.4)
5.2 Reducing -BNE to -NE
In this section we reduce in polynomial time the problem of computing an -BNE
for a two-player Bayesian game B to the problem of computing an -NE of a
polymatrix game P(B). We describe the construction of P(B) and prove that
every -NE for P(B) maps to an -BNE of B.
Construction. Let B be a two-player Bayesian game where the row player has
m types and k1 pure strategies and the column player has n types and k2 pure
strategies. We will construct a polymatrix game P(B) as follows.
The game has m + n players. We partition the set of players [m + n] into
two sets: the set K = {1, 2, . . . ,m} will represent the types of the row player in
B, while the set L = {m + 1,m + 2, . . . ,m + n} will represent the types of the
column player in B. The underlying graph that shows the interactions between
the players is a complete bipartite graph G = (K ∪ L,E), where every player in
K (respectively L) plays a bimatrix game with every player in L (respectively
K). The bimatrix game played between vertices vi ∈ K and vj ∈ L is defined to
be (R∗ij, C
∗
ij), where:
R∗ij := p
R
i (j) ·Rij, (5.5)
C∗ij := p
C
j (i) · Cij. (5.6)
for all i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n].
Observe that, for each player i in the K, the matrices R∗ij all have the same
number of rows, and for each player j ∈ L, the matrices C∗ij all have the same
number of columns. Thus, P(B) is a valid polymatrix game. Moreover, we clearly
have that P(B) has the same size as the original game B. Note that, since we
have assumed that the Bayesian game has been rescaled, we have that for every
player in P(B) the minimum (maximum) payoff achievable under pure strategy
profiles is 0 (1), so no further scaling is needed in order to apply our algorithm.
We can now prove that every -NE of the polymatrix game is also an -BNE
of the original two-player Bayesian game, which is the main result of this section.
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Theorem 8. Every -NE of P(B) is a -BNE for B.
Proof. Let z = (x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) be an -NE for P(B). This means that no
player can gain more than  by unilaterally changing his strategy. We define the
strategy profile (x,y) for B where x = (x1, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), and we
will show that (x,y) is an -BNE for B.
Let i ∈ K be a player. Since, z is an -NE of P(B), we have:
ui(xi, z) ≥ ui(x′i, z)−  for all x′i ∈ ∆k1 .
By construction, we can see that player i only interacts with the players from L.
Hence his payoff can be written as:
ui(xi, z) = x
T
i
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj = u
R(xi,y).
and since we are in an -NE, we have:
uR(xi,y) ≥ uR(x′i,y)−  for all x′i ∈ ∆k1 . (5.7)
This is true for all i ∈ K, thus it is true for all i ∈ [m].
Similarly, every player j ∈ L interacts only with players form K, thus:
uC(x, yj) = y
T
j
m∑
i=1
(C∗ij)
Txi.
Since we are in an -NE we have:
uC(x, yj) ≥ uC(x, y′j)−  for all y′j ∈ ∆k2 , (5.8)
and this is true for all j ∈ K, thus it is true for all j ∈ [n].
Combining now the fact that Equation (5.7) is true for all i ∈ [n] and that
Equation (5.8) is true for all j ∈ [m], it is easy to see that the strategy profile
(x,y) is an -BNE for B.
A direct corollary from Theorem ?? is that there is a polynomial time algo-
rithm that computes a (0.5 + δ)-approximate Bayes Nash Equilibrium. However,
as it is proved in the next section, there is a much simpler algorithm that com-
putes a 0.5-BNE for two player Bayesian games which can be applied in any
polymatrix game played on a bipartite graph.
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5.3 A Simple Algorithm for 0.5-BNE
In this section we present a simple algorithm for computing a 0.5-BNE for Bayesian
two player games. The algorithm is a generalization of the well known DMP tech-
nique of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [20]. We will use the reduction
presented above that constructs a bipartite polymatrix game P(B). We will call
as left side players the players created for the types of the row player and as right
side players those created for the types of the column one. The crucial property
that allows us to generalise the DMP technique is that all players on the one side
of the graph can simultaneously play a best response against a strategy profile of
the players from the opposite side without affecting the rest of the players from
their side.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Firstly, every player i in the left side
picks a (pure) strategy xi; we call that as left strategy profile and we denote it
by x = (x1, . . . , xm). Then, every player j in the right side computes a (pure)
best response yj against the left strategy profile x; we call this as right strategy
profile and we denote it by y∗ = (y1, . . . , yn). Finally, each player i in the left
side computes a (pure) best response xˆi against the right strategy profile y
∗. Let
x∗i =
xi+xˆi
2
and let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n). The algorithm returns the strategy profile
z = (x∗,y∗).
The Algorithm for 0.5-BNE
1. Pick a pure left strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xm).
2. For every i ∈ [n] compute a best response yi against x.
3. Define y∗ = (y1, . . . , yn) where yi is a best response against x.
4. Compute a best response xˆ against y∗.
5. Set x∗ = x+xˆ
2
.
6. Return the strategy profile (x∗,y∗).
Lemma 29. The strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is a 0.5-NE for the game P(B).
Proof. We will study the regret each player suffers under the strategy profile
z = (x∗,y∗). First, we study the players from the left side. Let i be a player from
the left side and let x∗i =
xi+xˆi
2
be the strategy computed by the algorithm for
that player. Since he interacts only with players from the right side, his regret
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Ri(z) is
Ri(z) = max
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj − x∗i ·
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj
= xˆi ·
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj − x∗i ·
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj (since xˆi is a best response against y
∗)
=
1
2
xˆi ·
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj −
1
2
xi ·
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj
≤ 1
2
xˆi ·
n∑
j=1
R∗ijyj
≤ 1
2
.
Thus, every player from the left side suffers regret at most 1
2
. Then we study the
regret Rj(z) a player j from the right side suffers under the profile z.
Rj(z) = max
m∑
i=1
C∗jix
∗
i − yj ·
m∑
i=1
C∗jix
∗
i
≤ 1
2
(
max
m∑
i=1
C∗jixi + max
m∑
i=1
C∗jixˆi
)
− yj ·
m∑
i=1
C∗jix
∗
i
=
1
2
max
m∑
i=1
C∗jixˆi −
1
2
yj ·
m∑
i=1
C∗jixˆi (since yj is a best response against x)
≤ 1
2
max
m∑
i=1
C∗jixˆi
≤ 1
2
.
Hence, all players suffer regret at most 1
2
. The claim follows.
Combining Lemma 29 with Theorem ?? we get the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm that computes a 0.5-BNE for
two player Bayesian games.
Note that the simple algorithm described above produces a better theoretical
approximation guarantee for Bayes Nash equilibria than the Descent. However,
it is easy to construct a tight for this generalisation of the DMP technique, while
we do not know whether the analysis for the Descent is tight. Nevertheless, the
strategy profile produced by this simple algorithm can be used as the starting
point for the Descent and increase its running time efficiency.
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Chapter 6
Lipschitz Games
In this chapter we study games with Lipschitz continuous utility functions for
the players. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the utility function
allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games.
We first define formally Lipschitz games and explain how they differ from the
games we studied so far. Then, we provide efficient algorithms for computing
approximate equilibria for several subclasses of Lipschitz games.
6.1 Lipschitz games preliminaries
We start by fixing some notation. Some notions used in this chapter are already
been defined, but we redefine them again here for the self-containment of the
chapter.
For each positive integer n we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, we use
∆n to denote the (n−1)-dimensional simplex, and ‖x‖qp to denote the (p, q)-norm
of a vector x ∈ Rd, i.e. ‖x‖qp = (
∑
i∈[d] |xi|p)q/p. When q = 1, then we will omit it
for notation simplicity. Given a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd, we use conv(X)
to denote the convex hull of X. A vector y ∈ conv(X) is said to be k-uniform
with respect to X if there exists a size k multiset S of [n] such that y = 1
k
∑
i∈S xi.
When X is clear from the context we will simply say that a vector is k-uniform
without mentioning that uniformity is with respect to X. We will use the notion
of the λp-Lipschitz continuity.
Definition 14 (λp-Lipschitz). A function f : A→ R, with A ⊆ Rd is λp-Lipschitz
continuous if for every x and y in A, it is true that
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ λ · ‖x− y‖p.
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Games and strategies. A game with M players can be described by a set
of available actions for each player and a utility function for each player that
depends both on his chosen action and the actions the rest of the players chose.
For each player i ∈ [M ] we use Si to denote his set of available actions and we
call it his strategy space. We will use xi ∈ Si to denote a specific action chosen
by player i and we will call it the strategy of player i, we use X = (x1, . . . , xM) to
denote a strategy profile of the game, and we will use X−i to denote the strategy
profile where the player i is excluded, i.e. X−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xM). We
use Ti(xi,X−i) to denote the utility of player i when he plays the strategy xi and
the rest of the players play according to the strategy profile X−i. A strategy xˆi
is a best response against the strategy profile X−i, if Ti(xˆi,X−i) ≥ Ti(xi,X−i)
for all xi ∈ Si. The regret player i suffers under a strategy profile X is the
difference between the utility of his best response and his utility under X, i.e.
Ti(xˆi,X−i)− Ti(xi,X−i).
Solution Concepts. A strategy profile is an equilibrium if no player can
increase his utility by unilaterally changing his strategy. A relaxed version of this
concept is the approximate equilibrium, or -equilibrium, in which no player can
increase his utility more than  by unilaterally changing his strategy. Formally,
a strategy profile X is an -equilibrium if for every player i it holds that
Ti(xi,X−i) ≥ Ti(x′i,X−i)−  for all x′i ∈ Si.
6.2 Classes of Lipschitz Games
In this section we define the classes of games studied in this chapter. We will study
λp-Lipschitz games, penalty games, biased games and distance biased games.
6.2.1 λp-Lipschitz games
This is a very general class of games, where each player’s strategy space is contin-
uous, and represented by a convex set of vectors, and where the only restriction
is that the payoff function is λp-Lipschitz continuous for some p ≥ 2. This class is
so general that exact equilibria, and even approximate equilibria may not exist.
Formally, an M -player λp-Lipschitz game L can be defined by the tuple
(M,n, λ, p, γ, T ) where:
• the strategy space Si of player i is the convex hull of at most n vectors
y1, . . . , yn in Rd,
• T is a set of λp-Lipschitz continuous functions and each Ti(X) ∈ T ,
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• and γ is a parameter that that intuitively shows how large the strategy
space of the players is, formally maxxi∈Si ‖xi‖p ≤ γ for every i ∈ [M ].
In what follows in this chapter we will assume that the Lipschitz continuity
of a game λp is bounded by a constant. Observe that for normal form games this
is not the case, since there are bimatrix games that are not constant Lipschitz
continuous.
6.2.2 Two Player Penalty Games
In these games, the players play a strategic form game, and their utility is the
payoff achieved in the game minus a penalty. The penalty function can be an
arbitrary function that depends on the player’s strategy. Formally, a two-player
penalty game P is defined by a tuple (R,C, fr(x), fc(y)), where (R,C) is a bi-
matrix game and fr(x) and fc(y) are the penalty functions for the row and the
column player respectively. The utilities for the players under a strategy profile
(x,y), denoted by Tr(x,y) and Tc(x,y), are given by Tr(x,y) = x
TRy−fr(x) and
Tc(x,y) = x
TCy− fc(y). In this chapter we will focus on games with λ-Lipschitz
penalty functions and we will use Pλ to denote this set. A special class of penalty
games is obtained when fr(x) = x
Tx and fc(y) = y
Ty. We call these games as
inner product penalty games.
We note that the class of penalty games is not contained in the class of λp-
Lipschitz games. In order to see that, observe that the “bimatrix” part of the
utility function may not be λp-Lipschitz continuous for any constant λp. So,
Tr(x,y) and Tc(x,y) are not λp-Lipschitz continuous.
6.2.3 Two Player Biased Games
This is a subclass of penalty games, where extra constraints are added to the
penalty functions fr(x) and fc(y) of the players. In this class of games there is a
base strategy and for each player and the penalty they receive is increasing with
the distance between the strategy they choose and their base strategy. Formally,
the row player has a base strategy p ∈ ∆n, the column player has a base strategy
q and their strictly increasing penalty functions are defined as fr(‖x− p‖st) and
fc(‖y − q‖lm) respectively.
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6.2.4 Distance Biased Games
This is a special class of biased games where the penalty function is a frac-
tion of the distance between the base strategy of the player and his chosen
strategy. Formally, a two player distance biased game B is defined by a tuple(
R,C, br(x,p), bc(y,q), dr, dc
)
, where (R,C) is a bimatrix game, p ∈ ∆n is a
base strategy for the row player, q ∈ ∆n is a base strategy for the column player,
br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖st and bc(y,q) = ‖y − q‖lm
are the penalty functions for the row and the column player respectively.
The utilities for the players under a strategy profile (x,y), denoted by Tr(x,y)
and Tc(x,y), are given by
Tr(x,y) = x
TRy − dr · br(x,p) and Tc(x,y) = xTCy − dc · bc(y,q),
where dr and dc are non negative constants.
6.3 Comparison Between the Classes of Games
Before we present our algorithms for computing approximate equilibria for Lip-
schitz games it would be useful to describe the differences between the classes
of games and to state what the current status of the equilibrium existence for
each one class. The Figure 6.3 shows the relation between the games’ classes.
It is well known that normal-form games possess an equilibrium [60], known as
Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Fiat and Papadimitriou [34] initiated
the study of existence of equilibria in penalty games. They studied games with
penalty functions that capture risk, they showed that there exist games with no
equilibrium and they proved that it is NP-complete to decide whether a game
possess an equilibrium or not. Mavronicolas and Monien [58] followed the work
of [34] and proved that it is NP-complete to decide the existence of equilibria
for more families of penalty games. Caragiannis, Kurokawa and Proccacia [10]
studied biased games and proved that a large family of biased games possess an
equilirbium. Distance biased games fall in this family and thus always possess
an equilibrium. Finally, for λp-Lipschitz games it is an interesting open question
whether they possess always an equilibrium, or there are cases that do not possess
an equilibrium.
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Penalty Games
Biased Games
Distance Biased Games
λp-Lipschitz Games Normal-form Games
No equilibrium Guaranteed equilibrium
Figure 6.1: A map that depicts the relations between the games studied in this
thesis and our current knowledge for the equilibrium existence for each class.
6.4 Approximate Equilibria in λp-Lipschitz Games
In this section, we give an algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in λp-
Lipschitz games. Recall that, as we have already mentioned λp-Lipschitz games
do not always possess an equilibrium. Nevertheless, our technique can be applied
irrespective of whether an exact equilibrium exists. If an exact equilibrium does
exist, then our technique will always find an -equilibrium. If an exact equilibrium
does not exist, then our algorithm either finds an -equilibrium or reports that
the game does not have an exact equilibrium.
In order to derive our algorithm we will utilize the following theorem that was
recently proved by Barman [5]. Intuitively, Barman’s theorem states that we can
approximate any point µ in the convex hull of n points using a uniform point µ′
that needs only “few” samples from µ to construct it.
Theorem 9 ([5]). Given a set of vectors X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd, let conv(X)
denote the convex hull of X. Furthermore, let γ := maxx∈X ‖x‖p for some 2 ≤
p < ∞. For every  > 0 and every µ ∈ conv(X), there exists an 4pγ2
2
uniform
vector µ′ ∈ conv(X) such that ‖µ− µ′‖p ≤ .
If we combine the Theorem 9 with the Definition 14 of the Lipschitz continuity,
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we get the following lemma.
Lemma 30. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Rd, let f : conv(X) → R be a λp-
Lipschitz continuous function for some 2 ≤ p < ∞, let  > 0 and let k = 4λ2pγ2
2
,
where γ := maxx∈X ‖x‖p. Furthermore, let f(x∗) be the optimum value of f .
Then we can compute a k-uniform point x′ ∈ conv(X) in time O(nk), such that
|f(x∗)− f(x′)| < .
Proof. From Theorem 9 we know that for the chosen value of k there exists a
k-uniform point x′ such that ‖x′ − x∗‖p < /λ. Since the function f(x) is λp-
Lipschitz continuous, we get that |f(x∗) − f(x′)| < . In order to compute this
point, we have to exhaustively evaluate the function f in all k-uniform points and
choose the point that maximizes/minimizes its value. Since there are
(
n+k−1
k
)
=
O(nk) possible k-uniform points, the theorem follows.
High level idea of our algorithm. Before we describe formally our algorithm,
let us give some intuition behind it. The high level idea of our algorithm is as
follows. We first prove that there exist uniform strategies that are -equilibria,
for every  > 0, when the game possess an exact equilibrium. We prove this by
using the Theorem 9. Thus, in order to find an -equilibrium we discretize the
strategy space for each player and then we only have to consider the uniform
strategy profiles and pick the profile that it is an -equilibrium. However, in λp-
Lipschitz games it is not trivial to decide whether a strategy profile is an , or even
an exact, equilibrium. So, we show how we can efficiently decide whether a profile
is 3-equilibrium and thus we can use our algorithm to compute a 3-equilibrium.
In what follows we will study a λp-Lipschitz game L := (M,n, λ, p, γ, T ).
Recall that M stands for the number of players, n for the number of points
whose convex hull defines the strategy space of each player, T is the space of the
λp-Lipschitz continuous utility functions and γ is the value that used in Theorem 9
that roughly shows how “large” is the strategy space of the players. Assuming the
existence of an exact Nash equilibrium, we establish the existence of a k-uniform
approximate equilibrium in the game L, where k depends on M,λ, p and γ. Note
that λ depends heavily on p and the utility functions for the players.
Since, by the definition of λp-Lipschitz games, the strategy space Si for every
player i is the convex hull of n vectors y1, . . . , yn in Rd, any xi ∈ Si can be written
as a convex combination of yj’s. Hence, xi =
∑n
j=1 αjyj, where αj > 0 for every
j ∈ [n] and ∑nj=1 αj = 1. Then, α = (α1, . . . , αn) is a probability distribution
over the vectors y1, . . . , yn, i.e. vector yj is drawn with probability αj. Thus, we
can sample a strategy xi by the probability distribution α.
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So, let X∗ be an equilibrium for L and let X′ be a sampled uniform strategy
profile from X∗. For each player i we define the following events
φi =
{|Ti(x′i,X′−i)− Ti(x∗i ,X∗−i)| < /2},
pii =
{
Ti(xi,X′−i) < Ti(x′i,X′−i) + 
}
for all possible xi,
ψi =
{
‖x′i − x∗i ‖p <

2Mλ
}
for some p > 0.
Notice that if all the events pii occur at the same time, then the sampled profile
X′ is an -equilibrium. We will show that if for a player i the events φi and
⋂
j ψj
hold, then the event pii has to be true too.
Lemma 31. For all i ∈ [M ] it holds that ⋂j∈[M ] ψj ∩ φi ⊆ pii.
Proof. Suppose that both events φi and
⋂
j ψj∈[M ] hold. We will show that the
event pii must be true too. Let xi be an arbitrary strategy, let X∗−i be a strategy
profile for the rest of the players, and let X′−i be a sampled strategy profile from
X∗−i. Since we assume that the events ψj is true for all j we get ‖X′−i − X∗−i‖p ≤∑
j 6=i ‖x′j − x∗j‖p we get that
‖X′−i − X∗−i‖p ≤
∑
j 6=i
‖x′j − x∗j‖p
≤
∑
j 6=i

2Mλ
<

2λ
.
Furthermore, since by assumption the utility functions for the players are λp-
Lipschitz continuous we have that∣∣Ti(xi,X′−i)− Ti(xi,X∗−i)∣∣ ≤ 2 .
This means that
Ti(xi,X′−i) ≤ Ti(xi,X∗−i) +

2
≤ Ti(x∗i ,X∗−i) +

2
(6.1)
where the last inequality holds since the strategy profile (x∗i ,X∗−i) is an equilibrium
of the game. Furthermore, since by assumption the event φi is true we get that
Ti(x
∗
i ,X∗−i) < Ti(x′i,X′−i) +

2
. (6.2)
Hence, if we combine the inequalities (6.1) and (6.2) we get that Ti(xi,X′−i) <
Ti(x
′
i,X′−i) +  for all possible xi. Thus, if the events φi and ψj for every j ∈ [M ]
hold, then the event pii holds too.
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We are ready to prove the main result of the section.
Theorem 10. Let L be a λp-Lipschitz game that possess an equilibrium. Then,
for any  > 0, there is a k-uniform strategy profile, with k = 16M
2λ2pγ2
2
that is an
-equilibrium for L.
Proof. In order to prove the claim, it suffices to show that there is a strategy
profile where every player plays a k-uniform strategy such that the events pii hold
for all i ∈ [M ]. Since the utility functions in L are λp-Lipschitz continuous it
holds that
⋂
i∈[n] ψi ⊆
⋂
i∈[n] φi. Furthermore, combining that with the Lemma 31
we get that
⋂
i∈[n] ψi ⊆
⋂
i∈[n] pii. Thus, if the event ψi is true for every i ∈ [n],
then the event
⋂
i∈[n] pii is true as well.
From the Theorem 9 we get that for each i ∈ [M ] there is a 16M2λ2pγ2
2
-uniform
point x′i such that the event ψi occurs with positive probability. The claim follows.
Theorem 10 establishes the existence of a k-uniform approximate equilibrium,
but this does not immediately give us our approximation algorithm. The obvious
approach is to perform a brute force check of all k-uniform strategies, and then
output the one that provides the best approximation. However, there is a problem
with this, since computing the quality of approximation requires us to compute
the regret for each player, which in turn requires us to compute a best response
for each player. Computing an exact best response in a Lipschitz game is a hard
problem in general, since we make no assumptions about the utility functions of
the players. Fortunately, it is sufficient to, instead, compute an approximate best
response for each player, and Lemma 30 can be used to do this. The following
Lemma is a consequence of Lemma 30.
Lemma 32. Let X be a strategy profile for a λp-Lipschitz game L, and let xˆi be
a best response for the player i against the profile X−i. There is a 4λ
2pγ2
2
-uniform
strategy x′i that is an δ-best response against X−i, i.e. |Ti(xˆi,X−i)−Ti(x′i,X−i)| <
δ.
Proof. In order to compute a best response it is equal to maximize the function
Ti(xi,X−i) with respect to xi. Since we assume that Ti(·) is λp continuous we can
apply Lemma 30 and compute the optimal solution, i.e. the best response for the
player i.
Our goal is to approximate the approximation guarantee for a given strategy
profile. More formally, given a strategy profile X that is an -equilibrium, and a
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constant δ > 0, we want an algorithm that outputs a number within the range
[ − δ,  + δ]. Lemma 32 allows us to do this. For a given strategy profile X,
we first compute δ-approximate best responses for each player, then we can use
these to compute δ-approximate regrets for each player. The maximum over the
δ-approximate regrets then gives us an approximation  with a tolerance of δ.
This is formalised in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 6. Evaluation of approximation guarantee
Input: A strategy profile X for L, and a constant δ > 0.
Output: An additive δ-approximation of the approximation guarantee
α(X) for the strategy profile X.
1. Set l = 4λ
2pγ2
δ2
.
2. For every player i ∈ [M ]
(a) For every l-uniform strategy x′i of player i compute Ti(x
′
i,X−i).
(b) Set m∗ = maxx′i Ti(x
′
i,X−i).
(c) Set Ri(X) = m∗ − Ti(xi,X−i).
3. Set α(X) = δ + maxi∈[M ]Ri(X).
4. Return α(X).
Utilising the above algorithm, we can now produce an algorithm to find an
approximate equilibrium in Lipschitz games. The algorithm checks all k-uniform
strategy profiles, using the value of k given by Theorem 10, and for each one,
computes an approximation of the quality approximation using the Algorithm 6
given above.
Algorithm 7. 3-equilibrium for λp-Lipschitz game L
Input: Game L and  > 0.
Output: A 3-equilibrium for L.
1. Set k > 16λ
2Mpγ2
2
.
2. For every k-uniform strategy profile X′
(a) Compute an -approximation of α(X′).
(b) If the -approximation of α(X′) is less than 2, return X′.
If the algorithm returns a strategy profile X, then it must be a 3 equilibrium.
This is because we check that an -approximation of α(X) is less than 2, and
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therefore α(X) ≤ 3. Secondly, we argue that if the game has an exact Nash
equilibrium, then this procedure will always output a 3-approximate equilibrium.
From Theorem 10 we know that if k > 16λ
2Mpγ2
2
, then there is a k-uniform strategy
profile X that is an -equilibrium for L. When we apply our approximate regret
algorithm to X, to find an -approximation of α(X), the algorithm will return a
number that is less than 2, hence X will be returned by the algorithm.
To analyse the running time, observe that there are
(
n+k−1
k
)
= O(nk) possible
k-uniform strategies for each player, thus O(nMk) k-uniform strategy profiles.
Furthermore, our regret approximation algorithm runs in time O(Mnl), where
l = 4λ
2pγ2
2
. Hence, we get the next theorem.
Theorem 11. Given a λp-Lipschitz game L that possess an equilibrium and
any  > 0, a 3-equilibrium can be computed in time O
(
MnMk+l
)
, where k =
O
(
λ2Mpγ2
2
)
and l = O
(
λ2pγ2
2
)
.
Notice that it might be computationally hard to decide whether a game pos-
sesses an equilibrium or not. Nevertheless, our algorithm can be applied in any
λp-Lipschitz game, without being affected by the existence or not of an exact
equilibrium. If the game does not possesses an exact equilibrium then our al-
gorithm either finds an approximate equilibrium or fails to find an approximate
equilibrium. In the latter case the algorithm decides that the game does not
possess an exact equilibrium, since if it had one, it would have an -equilibrium
too.
Theorem 12. For any game λp-Lipschitz game L in time O
(
MnMk+l
)
, we can
either compute a 3-equilibrium, or decide that L does not possess an exact equi-
librium, where k = O
(
λ2Mpγ2
2
)
and l = O
(
λ2pγ2
2
)
.
6.5 An Algorithm for Penalty Games
In this section we study two-player penalty games that belong in the class Pλ,
i.e. penalty games with λ-Lipschitz continuous penalty functions. We present
an algorithm that, for any  > 0, can compute an -equilibrium for any penalty
game in Pλ in quasi-polynomial time. This means that if N is the size of the
game, then our algorithm can compute an -equilibrium in time NO(logN). For
the algorithm, we take the same approach as we did in the previous section
for λp-Lipschitz games: We show that if an exact equilibrium exists, then a k-
uniform approximate equilibrium always exists too, and provide a brute-force
search algorithm for finding it. Once again, since best response computation may
84
be hard for this class of games, we must provide an approximation algorithm for
finding the quality of an approximate equilibrium. The majority of this section
is dedicated to proving an appropriate bound for k, to ensure that k-uniform
approximate equilibria always exist.
We first focus on penalty games that possess an exact equilibrium. So, let
(x∗,y∗) be an equilibrium of the game and let (x′,y′) be a k-uniform strategy
profile sampled from this equilibrium. We define the following four events:
φr =
{|Tr(x′,y′)− Tr(x∗,y∗)| < /2}
pir =
{
Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x′,y′) + 
}
for all x
φc =
{|Tc(x′,y′)− Tc(x∗,y∗)| < /2}
pic =
{
Tc(x
′,y) < Tc(x′,y′) + 
}
for all y.
The events pir and pic ensure that under the k-uniform strategy profile (x
′,y′)
no player can gain more than  by changing his strategy, i.e. (x′,y′) is an -
equilibrium. The events φr and φc ensure that the payoffs the players get under
the profile (x′,y′) is at most -away from the payoffs the players get under the
exact equilibrium. The goal is to derive a value for k such that all the four events
above are true, or equivalently Pr(φr ∩ pir ∩ φc ∩ pir) > 0.
Note that in order to prove that (x′,y′) is an -equilibrium we only have to
consider the events pir and pic. Nevertheless, as we show in the Lemma 33, the
events φr and φc are crucial in our analysis. The proof of the main theorem boils
down to the events φr and φc. Furthermore, proving that there is a k-uniform
profile (x′,y′) that fulfills the events φr and φc too, proves that the approximate
equilibrium we compute approximates the utilities the players receive under an
exact equilibrium too.
In what follows, we will focus only on the row player, since similar analysis
can be applied for the column player. Firstly, we study the event pir and we show
how we can relate it with the event φr.
Lemma 33. For all penalty games it holds that Pr(picr) ≤ n · e−
k2
2 + Pr(φcr).
Proof. We begin by introducing the following auxiliary events for all i ∈ [n]
ψri =
{
Riy
′ < Riy∗ +

2
}
.
We prove how the events ψri and the event φr are related with the event pir.
Assume that the event φr and the events ψri for all i ∈ [n] are true. Let x be
any mixed strategy for the row player. Since by assumption Riy
′ < Riy∗ + 2
and since x is a probability distribution, it holds that xTRy′ < xTRy∗ + 
2
. If
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we subtract fr(x) from each side we get that x
TRy′− fr(x) < xTRy∗− fr(x) + 2 .
This means that Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x,y∗)+ 2 for all x. But we know that Tr(x,y
∗) ≤
Tr(x
∗,y∗) for all x ∈ ∆n, since (x∗,y∗) is an equilibrium. Thus, we get that
Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x∗,y∗) + 2 for all possible x. Furthermore, since the event φr
is true too, we get that Tr(x,y
′) < Tr(x′,y′) + . Thus, if the events φr and
ψri for all i ∈ [n] are true, then the event pir must be true as well. Formally,
φr
⋂
i∈[n] ψri ⊆ pir. Thus, Pr(picr) ≤ Pr(φcr) +
∑
i ψri. Using the Hoeffding bound,
we get that Pr(ψcri) ≤ e−
k2
2 for all i ∈ [n]. Our claim follows.
With Lemma 33 in hand, we can see that in order to compute a value for k
it is sufficient to study the event φr. We introduce the following auxiliary events
that we will study seperately:
φru =
{|x′TRy′ − x∗TRy∗| < /4}
φrb =
{|fr(x′)− fr(x∗)| < /4}.
It is easy to see that if both φrb and φru are true, then the event φr must be
true too, formally φrb ∩ φru ⊆ φr. Using the analysis from Lipton, Markakis and
Mehta [56] we can prove that Pr(φcru) ≤ 2e−
k2
8 . Thus, it remains to study the
the event φcrb.
Lemma 34. Pr(φcrb) ≤ 8λ
√
p

√
k
.
Proof. Since we assume that the penalty function fr(x
′) is λp-Lipschitz continuous
the event φrb can be replaced by the event φrb′ =
{‖x′−x∗‖p < /4λ}. It is easy
to see that φrb ⊆ φrb′ . Then, using the proof of Theorem 2 from [5] we get that
E[‖x′ − x∗‖p] ≤ 2
√
p√
k
. Thus, using Markov’s inequality we get that
Pr(‖x′ − x∗‖p ≥ 
4λ
) ≤ E[‖x
′ − x∗‖p]

4λ
≤ 8λ
√
p

√
k
.
We are ready to prove our theorem.
Theorem 13. For any equilibrium (x∗,y∗) of a penalty game from the class Pλ,
any  > 0, and any k ∈ Ω(λ2 logn)
2
, there exists a k-uniform strategy profile (x′,y′)
such that:
1. (x′,y′) is an -equilibrium for the game,
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2. |Tr(x′,y′)− Tr(x∗,y∗)| < /2,
3. |Tc(x′,y′)− Tc(x∗,y∗)| < /2.
Proof. Let us define the event GOOD = φr ∩ φc ∩ pir ∩ pic. In order to prove our
theorem it suffices to prove that Pr(GOOD) > 0. Notice that for the events φc
and pic we can use the same analysis as for φr and pir and get the same bounds.
Thus, using Lemma 33 and the analysis for the events φru and φrb we get that
Pr(GOODc) ≤ Pr(φcr) + Pr(picr) + Pr(φcc) + Pr(picc)
≤ 2(Pr(φcr) + Pr(picr))
≤ 2(2Pr(φcr) + n · e− k22 ) (from Lemma 33)
≤ 2(2Pr(φcru) + 2Pr(φcrb′) + n · e− k22 )
≤ 2(4e− k28 + 8λ√p

√
k
+ n · e− k
2
2
)
(from Lemma 34)
< 1 for the chosen value of k.
Thus, Pr(GOOD) > 0 and our claim follows.
Theorem 13 establishes the existence of a k-uniform strategy profile (x′,y′)
that is an -equilibrium. However, as with the previous section, we must provide
an efficient method for approximating the quality of approximation provided by
a given strategy profile. To do so, we first give the following lemma, which shows
that approximate best responses can be computed in quasi-polynomial time for
penalty games.
Lemma 35. Let (x,y) be a strategy profile for a penalty game Pλ, and let xˆ be a
best response against y. There is an l-uniform strategy x′, with l = 17λ
2√p
2
, that
is an -best response against y, i.e. Tr(xˆ,y) < Tr(x
′,y) + .
Proof. We will prove that |Tr(xˆ,y)− Tr(x′,y)| <  which implies our claim. Let
φ1 = {|xˆTRy − x′TRy| ≤ /2} and φ2 = {|fr(xˆ) − fr(x′)| < /2}. Notice that
Lemma 34 does not use anywhere the fact that x∗ is an equilibrium strategy,
thus it holds even if x∗ is replaced by xˆ. Thus, Pr(φc2) ≤ 4λ
√
p

√
k
. Furthermore,
using the analysis from [56] again, we can prove that Pr(φc1) ≤ 2e−
k2
4 and using
similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 13 it can be easily proved that for
the chosen value of l it holds that Pr(φc1) + Pr(φ
c
2) < 1, thus the events φ1 and
φ2 occur with positive probability and our claim follows.
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Having given this Lemma, we can reuse Algorithm 6, but with l set equal to
17λ2
√
p
2
, to provide an algorithm that aproximates the quality of approximation
of a given strategy profile. Then, we can reuse Algorithm 7 with k = Ω(λ
2 logn)
2
to provide a quasi-polynomial time algorithm that finds approximate equilibia in
penalty games. Notice again that our algorithm can be applied in games that
it is computationally hard to verify whether an exact equilibrium exists. Our
algorithm either will compute an approximate equilibrium or it will fail to find
one, thus it will decide that the game does not posses an exact equilibrium.
Theorem 14. In any penalty game Pλ and any  > 0, in time O(nk+l), where
k = Ω(λ
2 logn)
2
and l =
17λ2
√
p
2
, we can either compute a 3-equilibrium, or decide
that Pλ does not possess an exact equilibrium.
6.6 Distance Biased Games
In this section, we focus on three particular classes of distance biased games, and
we provide polynomial-time approximation algorithms for these games. Recall
that distance biased games are penalty games with penalty function from a spe-
cific family of functions. More specifically, distance biased games have penalty
functions of the form
Tr(x,y) = x
TRy − dr · br(x,p) and Tc(x,y) = xTCy − dc · bc(y,q),
where dr and dc are positive constants and p and q are “base” strategies for
the player. Intuitively, the players are penalized for deviating from their base
strategies. In this section we study the following three penalty functions:
• L1 penalty: br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖1 =
∑
i |xi − pi|.
• L22 penalty: br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖22 =
∑
i(xi − pi)2.
• L∞ penalty: br(x,p) = ‖x− p‖∞ = maxi |xi − pi|.
Our approach is to follow the well-known technique of Daskalakis, Mehta and
Papadimitriou [20] that finds a 0.5-NE in a bimatrix game. The algorithm that
we will use for all three penalty functions is given below.
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Algorithm 8. The Base Algorithm
1. Compute a best response y∗ against p.
2. Compute a best response x against y∗.
3. Set x∗ = δ · p + (1− δ) · x, for some δ ∈ [0, 1].
4. Return the strategy profile (x∗,y∗).
While this is a well-known technique for bimatrix games, note that it cannot
immediately be applied to penalty games. This is because the algorithm requires
us to compute two best response strategies, and while computing a best-response
is trivial in bimatrix games, this is not the case for penalty games. Best responses
for L1 and L∞ penalties can be computed in polynomial-time via linear program-
ming, and for L22 penalties, the ellipsoid algorithm can be applied. However, these
methods do not provide strongly polynomial algorithms.
In this section we develop simple combinatorial algorithms for computing
best response strategies for each of these penalties. Our algorithms are strongly
polynomial. Then, we determine the quality of the approximation given by the
base algorithm when our best response techniques are used. In what follows we
make the common assumption that the payoffs of the underlying bimatrix game
(R,C) are in [0, 1].
6.6.1 A 2/3-Approximation Algorithm for L1-Biased Games
We start by considering L1-biased games. Suppose that we want to compute a
best-response for the row player against a fixed strategy y of the column player.
We will show that best response strategies in L1-biased games have a very par-
ticular form: if b is the best response strategy in the (unbiased) bimatrix game
(R,C), then the best-response places all of its probability on b except for a certain
set of rows S where it is too costly to shift probability away from p. The rows
i ∈ S will be played with pi to avoid taking the penalty for deviating.
The characterisation for whether it is too expensive to shift away from p is
given by the following lemma.
Lemma 36. Let j be a pure strategy, let k be a pure strategy with pk > 0, and
let x be a strategy with xk = pk. The utility for the row player increases when we
shift probability from k to j if and only if Rjy −Rky − 2dr > 0.
Proof. Suppose that we shift δ probability from k to j, where δ ∈ (0,pk]. Then
the utility for the row player is equal to Tr(x,y) + δ · (Rjy − Rky − 2dr), where
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the final term is the penalty for shifting away from k. Thus, the utility for the
row player increases under this shift if and only if Rjy −Rky − 2dr > 0.
Observe that, if we are able to shift probability away from a strategy k,
then we should obviously shift it to a best response strategy for the (unbiased)
bimatrix game, since this strategy maximizes the increase in our payoff. Hence,
our characterisation of best response strategies is correct. This gives us the
following simple algorithm for computing best responses.
Algorithm 9. Best Response Algorithm for L1 penalty
1. Set S = 0.
2. Compute a best response b against y in the unbiased bimatrix game
(R,C).
3. For each index i 6= b in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
(a) If Rb · y −Ri · y − 2dr ≤ 0, then set xi = pi and S = S + pi.
(b) Otherwise set xi = 0
4. Set xb = 1− S.
5. Return x.
Our characterisation has a number of consequences. Firstly, it can be seen
that if dr ≥ 1/2, then there is no profitable shift of probability between any two
pure strategies, since 0 ≤ Riy ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Thus, we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. If dr ≥ 1/2, then the row player always plays the strategy p irre-
spectively from which strategy his opponent plays, i.e. p is a dominant strategy.
Moreover, since we can compute a best response in polynomial time we get
the next theorem.
Theorem 15. In biased games with L1 penalty functions and max{dr, dc} ≥ 1/2,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that dr ≥ 1/2. Then from Corollary 2 the row player will play his
base strategy p. Then we can use Algorithm 9 to compute a best response against
p for the column player. Then, this profile will be an equilibrium for the game
since no player can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.
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Finally, using the characterization of best responses we can see that there
is a connection between the equilibria of the distance biased game and the well
supported Nash equilibria (WSNE) of the underlying bimatrix game.
Theorem 16. Let B = (R,C, br(x,p), bc(y,q), dr, dc) be a distance biased game
with L1 penalties and let d := max{dr, dc}. Any equilirbium of B is a 2d-WSNE
for the bimatrix game (R,C).
Proof. Let (x∗,y∗) be an equilibrium for B. From the best response Algorithm 9
we can see that x∗i > 0 if and only if Rb ·y∗−Ri ·y∗−2dr ≤ 0, where b is a pure best
response against y∗. This means that for every i ∈ [n] with x∗i > 0, it holds that
Ri ·y∗ ≥ maxj∈[n] Rj ·y∗−2d. Similarly, it holds that CTi ·x∗ ≥ maxj∈[n] CTj ·x∗−2d
for all i ∈ [n] with y∗i > 0. This is the definition of a 2d-WSNE for the bimatrix
game (R,C).
Approximation Algorithm
We now analyse the approximation guarantee provided by the base algorithm for
L1-biased games. So, let (x
∗,y∗) be the strategy profile that is returned by the
base algorithm. Since we have already shown that exact Nash equilibria can be
found in games with either dc ≥ 1/2 or dr ≥ 1/2, we will assume that both dc
and dr are less than 1/2, since this is the only interesting case.
We start by considering the regret of the row player. The following lemma
will be used in the analysis of all three of our approximation algorithms.
Lemma 37. Under the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) the regret for the row player is at
most δ.
Proof. Notice that for all i ∈ [n] we have
|δpi + (1− δ)xi − pi| = (1− δ)|xi − pi|,
hence ‖x∗−p‖1 = (1−δ)‖x−p‖1 and ‖x∗−p‖∞ = (1−δ)‖x−p‖∞. Furthermore,
notice that
∑
i
(
(1 − δ)xi + δpi − pi
)2
= (1 − δ)2‖x − p‖22, thus ‖x∗ − p‖22 ≤
(1− δ)‖x−p‖22. Hence, for the payoff of the row player it holds that Tr(x∗,y∗) ≥
δ · Tr(p,y∗) + (1− δ) · Tr(x,y∗) and his regret under the strategy profile (x∗,y∗)
is
Rr(x∗,y∗) = max
x˜
Tr(x˜,y
∗)− Tr(x∗,y∗)
= Tr(x,y
∗)− Tr(x∗,y∗) (since x is a best response against y∗)
≤ δ(Tr(x,y∗)− Tr(p,y∗))
≤ δ (since max
x
Tr(x,y
∗) ≤ 1 and Tr(p,y∗) ≥ 0).
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Next, we consider the regret of the column player. The following lemma will
be used for both the L1 case and the L∞ case. Observe that in the L1 case, the
precondition of dc ·bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1 always holds, since we have ‖y∗−q‖1 ≤ 2. Thus
dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1 since we are only interested in the case where dc ≤ 1/2.
Lemma 38. If dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1, then under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) the column
player suffers at most 2− 2δ regret.
Proof. The regret of the column player under the strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is
Rc(x∗,y∗) = max
y
Tc(x
∗,y)− Tc(x∗,y∗)
= max
y
{
(1− δ)Tc(x,y) + δTc(p,y)
)}− (1− δ)Tc(x,y∗)− δTc(p,y∗)
≤ (1− δ)(max
y
Tc(x
∗,y)− Tc(x,y∗)
)
(since y∗ is a best response against p)
≤ (1− δ)(1 + dc · bc(y∗,q)) (since max
x
Tc(x
∗,y) ≤ 1)
≤ (1− δ) · 2 (since dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1).
To complete the analysis, we must select a value for δ that equalises the two
regrets. It can easily be verified that setting δ = 2/3 ensures that δ = 2 − 2δ,
and so we have the following theorem.
Theorem 17. In biased games with L1 penalties a 2/3-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
6.6.2 A 5/7-Approximation Algorithm for L22-Biased Games
We now turn our attention to biased games with an L22 penalty. Again, we start
by giving a combinatorial algorithm for finding a best response. Throughout this
section, we fix y as a column player strategy, and we will show how to compute
a best response for the row player.
Best responses in L22-biased games can be found by solving a quadratic pro-
gram, and actually this particular quadratic program can be solved via the ellip-
soid algorithm [54]. We will give a simple combinatorial algorithm that uses the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and produces a closed formula for the
solution. Hence, we will obtain a strongly polynomial time algorithm for finding
best responses.
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Our algorithm can be applied on L22 penalty functions and any value dr, but
for notation simplicity we describe our method for dr = 1. Furthermore, we define
αi := Riy + 2pi and we call αi as the payoff of pure strategy i. Then, the utility
for the row player can be written as Tr(x,y) =
∑n
i=1 xi · αi −
∑n
i=1 x
2
i − pTp.
Notice that the term pTp is a constant and it does not affect the solution of the
best response; so we can exclude it from our computations. Thus, a best response
for the row player against strategy y is the solution of the following quadratic
program
maximize
n∑
i=1
xi · αi −
n∑
i=1
x2i
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n].
The Lagrangian function for this problem is
L(x,y, λ,u) =
n∑
i=1
xi · αi −
n∑
i=1
x2i − λ(
n∑
i=1
xi − 1)−
n∑
i=1
uixi
and the corresponding KKT conditions
αi − λ− 2xi − ui = 0 for all i ∈ [n] (6.3)
n∑
i=1
xi = 1 (6.4)
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] (6.5)
xi · ui = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. (6.6)
Constraints (6.3)-(6.5) are the stationarity conditions and (6.6) are the comple-
mentarity slackness conditions. We say that strategy x is a feasible response if it
satisfies the KKT conditions. The obvious way to compute a best response is by
exhaustively checking all 2n possible combinations for the complementarity con-
ditions and choose the feasible response that maximizes the utility for a player.
Next we prove how we can bypass the brute force technique and compute all best
responses in polynomial time.
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn.
That is, the pure strategies are ordered according to their payoffs. In the next
lemma we prove that in every best response, if a player plays the pure strategy
l with positive probability, then he must play every pure strategy k with k < l
with positive probability.
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Lemma 39. In every best response x∗, if x∗l > 0 then x
∗
k > 0 for all k < l.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a best response x∗
and a k < l such that x∗l > 0 and x
∗
k = 0. Let us denote M =
∑
i 6={l,k} αi ·
x∗i −
∑
i 6={l,k} x
∗2
i . Suppose now that we shift some probability, denoted by δ,
from pure strategy l to pure strategy k. Then the utility for the row player is
Tr(x
∗,y) = M + αl · (x∗l − δ) − (x∗l − δ)2 + αk · δ − δ2, which is maximized for
δ =
αk−αl+2x∗l
4
. Notice that δ > 0 since αk ≥ αl and x∗l > 0. Thus the row player
can increase his utility by assigning positive probability to pure strategy k, which
contradicts the fact that x∗ is a best response.
Lemma 39 implies that there are only n possible supports that a best response
can use. Indeed, we can exploit the KKT conditions to derive, for each candidate
support, the exact probability that each pure strategy would be played. We derive
the probability as a function of αi’s and of the support size. Suppose that the
KKT conditions produce a feasible response when we set the support to have size
k. From condition (6.3) we get that xi =
1
2
(αi − λ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and zero
else. But we know that
∑k
j xj = 1. Thus we get that
∑k
j=1
1
2
(αj − λ) = 1 and if
we solve for λ, we get that λ =
∑k
j=1 αj−2
k
. This means that for all i ∈ [k] we get
xi =
1
2
(
αi −
∑k
j=1 αj − 2
k
)
. (6.7)
So, our algorithm does the following. It iterates through all n candidate
supports for a best response. For each one, it uses Equation (6.7) to determine
the probabilities, and then checks whether these satisfy the KKT conditions, and
thus, if this is a feasible response. If it is, then it is saved in a list of feasible
responses, otherwise it is discarded. After all n possibilities have been checked,
a feasible response with the highest payoff is then returned.
Algorithm 10. Best Response Algorithm for L22 penalty
1. For i = 1 . . . n
(a) Set x1 ≥ . . . ≥ xi > 0 and xi+1 = . . . = xn = 0.
(b) Check if there is a feasible response under these constraints.
(c) If so, add it to the list of feasible responses.
2. Among the feasible responses choose one with the highest utility.
We now show that the base algorithm gives a 5/7-approximation when applied
to L22-penalty games. For the row player’s regret, we can use Lemma 37 to show
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that the regret is bounded by δ. However, for the column player’s regret, things
are more involved. We will show that the regret of the column player is at most
2.5− 2.5δ. That analysis depends on the maximum entry of the base strategy q
and more specifically on whether maxk{qk} ≤ 1/2 or not.
Lemma 40. If maxk{qk} ≤ 1/2, then the regret the column player suffers under
strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is at most 2.5− 2.5δ.
Proof. Note that when maxk{qk} ≤ 1/2, then bc = ‖y − p‖22 ≤ 1.5 for all
possible y. Then, using the analysis from Lemma 38, along with the fact that
dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 2 for L22 penalties, and since by assumption dc = 1, the claim
follows.
For the case where there is a k such that qk > 1/2 a more involved analysis
is needed. The first goal is to prove that under any strategy y∗ that is a best
response against p the pure strategy k is played with positive probability. In
order to prove that, first it is proven that there is a feasible response against
strategy p where pure strategy k is played with positive probability. In what
follows we denote αi := C
T
i p + 2qi.
Lemma 41. Let qk > 1/2 for some k ∈ [n]. Then there is a feasible response
where pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Proof. Note that αk > 1 since by assumption qk > 1/2. Recall from Equa-
tion (6.7) that, in a feasible response y, it holds that yi =
1
2
(
αi −
∑k
j=1 αj−2
k
)
.
In order to prove the claim it is sufficient to show that yk > 0 when in the
KKT conditions is set yi > 0 for all i ∈ [k]. Or equivalently, to show that
αk −
∑k
j=1 αj−2
k
= 1
k
(
(k − 1)αk + 2−
∑k−1
j=1 αj
)
> 0. But,
(k − 1)αk + 2−
k−1∑
j=1
αj > k + 1−
k−1∑
j=1
(
CTx + 2qi
)
(since αk > 1)
≥ k + 1− (k − 1)−
k−1∑
j=1
2qi
≥ 1 + qk (since q ∈ ∆n)
> 0.
The claim follows.
Next it is proven that the utility of the column player is increasing when he
adds pure strategies i in his support such that αi > 1.
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Lemma 42. Let yk and yk+1 be two feasible responses with support size k and
k + 1 respectively, where αk+1 > 1. Then Tc(x,y
k+1) > Tc(x,y
k).
Proof. Let yk be a feasible response with support size k for the column player
against strategy p and let λ(k) :=
∑k
j=1 αj−2
2k
. Then the utility of the column
player when he plays yk can be written as
Tc(x,y
k) =
n∑
i=1
yki · αi −
n∑
i=1
(xki )
2 − qTq
=
k∑
i=1
yki
(
αi − yki
)− qTq
=
k∑
i=1
(αi
2
− λ(k)
)(αi
2
+ λ(k)
)
− qTq
=
1
4
k∑
i=1
α2i − k ·
(
λ(k)
)2 − qTq.
The goal now is to prove that Tc(x,y
k+1)−Tc(x,yk) > 0. By the previous analysis
for Tc(x,y
k) and if A :=
∑k
i=1 αi − 2, then
Tc(x,y
k+1)− Tc(x,yk) = 1
4
k+1∑
i=1
α2i − (k + 1)
(
λ(k + 1)
)2 − 1
4
k∑
i=1
α2i + k ·
(
λ(k)
)2
=
1
4
(
α2k+1 +
A2
k
− (A+ αk+1)
2
k + 1
)
=
1
4
(
α2k+1 +
1
k + 1
(A2 − α2k+1 − 2Aαk+1)
)
=
1
4(k + 1)
(
kα2k+1 + A
2 − 2Aαk+1
)
>
1
4(k + 1)
(
k + A2 − 2A) (since 1 < αk+1 ≤ 2 and A > k − 2)
>
1
4(k + 1)
(
k2 − 5k + 8) (since A > k − 2)
> 0.
Notice that αk ≥ 2pk > 1. Thus, the utility of the feasible response that
assigns positive probability to pure strategy k is strictly greater than the utility
of any feasible response that does not assign probability to k. Thus, strategy k
is always played in a best response. Hence, the next lemma follows.
96
Lemma 43. If there is a k ∈ [n] such that qk > 1/2, then in every best response
y∗ the pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Using now Lemma 43 we can provide a better bound for the regret the column
player suffers, since in every best response y∗ the pure strategy k is played with
positive probability.
Lemma 44. Let y∗ be a best response when there is a pure strategy k with
qk > 1/2. Then the regret for the column player under strategy profile (x
∗,y∗) is
bounded by 2− 2δ.
Proof. Recall from the analysis for the Algorithm 1 that the regret for the column
player is
Rc(x∗,y∗) ≤ (1− δ)
(
max
y˜∈∆
{xˆTCy˜}+ 2y˜Tqk − 2y∗Tq + y∗Ty∗
)
≤ (1− δ)(1 + 2qk − 2y∗Tq + y∗Ty∗). (6.8)
We focus now on the term y∗
T
y∗−2y∗Tq. It can be proven 1 that y∗Ty∗−2y∗Tq ≤
1− 2qk. Thus, from (6.8) we get that Rc(x∗,y∗) ≤ 2− 2δ.
Recall now that the regret for the row player is bounded by δ, so if we optimize
with respect to δ the regrets are equal for δ = 2/3. Thus, the next theorem
follows, since when there is a k with qk > 1/2 the Algorithm 1 produces a 2/3-
equilibrium. Hence, combining this with Lemma 40, the Theorem 18 follows for
δ = 5/7.
Theorem 18. In biased games with L22 penalties a 5/7-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
6.6.3 A 13/21-Approximation for Inner-Product Penalty
Games
We observe that we can also tackle the case where the penalty function is the
inner product of the strategy played, i.e. when the players have L22 penalties and
p = q = 0. For these games, that we call “inner product penalty games”, we
replace p as the starting point of the base algorithm with the fully mixed strategy
xn. Hence, for that case x∗ = δ · xn + (1− δ) · x for some δ ∈ [0, 1].
Again, the regret the row player suffers under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is
bounded by δ.
1Section 6.6.5
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Lemma 45. When the penalty function is the inner product of the strategy played,
then the regret for the row player under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is bounded by δ.
Furthermore, using similar analysis as in Lemma 38, it can be proven that
the regret for the column player under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is bounded by
(1 − δ)(1 + dc · y∗Ty∗). For the column player we will distinguish between the
cases where dc ≤ 1/2 and dc > 1/2. For the first case where dc ≤ 1/2 it is
easy see that the algorithm produces a 0.6-equilibrium. For the other case, when
dc > 1/2, first it is proven that there is no pure best response.
Lemma 46. If the penalty for the column player is equal to yTy and dc >
1
2
,
then there is no pure best response against any strategy of the row player.
Proof. Let Cj to denote the payoff of the column player from his j-th pure strategy
against some strategy x played by the row player. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that there is a pure best response for the column player where, without
loss of generality, he plays only his first pure strategy. Suppose now that he shifts
some probability to his second strategy, that is, he plays the first pure strategy
with probability x and the second pure strategy with probability 1 − x. The
utility for the column player under this mixed strategy is x · C1 + (1− x) · C2 −
dc · (x2 + (1−x)2), which is maximized for x = 2dc+C1−C24dc , where C1 and C2 stand
for the first and the second column respectively of the matrix C. Notice that
x > 0, which means that the column player can deviate from the pure strategy
and increase his utility. The claim follows.
With Lemma 46 in hand, it can be proven that when dc > 1/2 the column
player does not play any pure strategy with probability greater than 3/4.
Lemma 47. If dc > 1/2, then in y
∗ no pure strategy is played with probability
greater than 3/4.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a pure strategy i in
y∗ that is played with probability greater than 3/4. Furthermore, let k be the
support size of y∗. From Lemma 46, since dc > 1/2, we know that there is
no pure best response, thus k ≥ 2. Then using Equation (6.7) we get that
3
4
< 1
2
(
αi −
∑k
j=1 αj−2
k
)
. If we solve for αj we get that αi >
3k−4
2k−2 > 1 which is a
contradiction since, when q = 0, it holds that αi = C
T
i x ≤ 1.
A direct corollary from Lemma 47 is that y∗
T
y∗ ≤ 5/8. Hence, we can prove
the following lemma.
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Lemma 48. Under strategy profile (x∗,y∗) the regret for the column player is
bounded by 13
8
(1− δ).
Proof. Firstly, note that Tc(x
∗,y∗) = δxn
T
Cy∗+(1−δ)xTCy∗−y∗Ty∗. Moreover,
maxy˜∈∆{xnTCy˜− y˜T y˜} − Tc(xn,y∗) = 0, since y∗ is a best response against xn.
Finally, notice that 0 ≤ yTy ≤ 1 for all y. Thus, the regret for the column player
is
Rc(x∗,y∗) = (1− δ)
(
max
y˜∈∆
{xTCy˜ − y˜T y˜} − xTCy∗ + y∗Ty∗
)
< (1− δ)(1 + 5
8
)
.
which matches the claimed result.
If we combine Lemmas 45 and 48 and solve for δ we can see that the regrets
are equal for δ = 13
21
. Thus, we get the following theorem for biased games where
q = 0.
Theorem 19. The strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is a 13
21
-equilibrium for biased games
with q = 0.
6.6.4 A 2/3-Approximation for L∞-Biased Games
Finally, we turn our attention to the L∞ penalty. We start by giving a combinato-
rial algorithm for finding best responses. Similar to the best response Algorithm
for the L1 penalty, the intuition is to start from the base strategy p of the row
player and shift probability from pure strategies with low payoff to pure strategies
with higher payoff. This time though, the shifted probability will be distributed
between the pure strategies with higher payoff.
Without loss of generality assume that R1y ≥ . . . ≥ Rny, ie., that the strate-
gies are ordered according to their payoff in the unbiased bimatrix game. The
set of pure strategies of the row player can be partitioned into three disjoint sets
according to the payoff they yield:
H := {i ∈ [n] : Riy = R1y}
M := {i ∈ ([n] \ H) : R1y −Riy − dr < 0}
L := {i ∈ [n] : R1y −Riy − dr > 0}.
Next we give an algorithm that computes a best response for L∞ penalty.
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Algorithm 11. Best Response Algorithm for L∞ penalty
1. For all i ∈ L, set xi = 0.
2. If P ≤ |H| · pmax, then set xi = pi + P|H| for all i ∈ H and xj = pj for
j ∈M.
3. Else if P < |H ∪M| · pmax, then
• Set xi = pi + pmax for all i ∈ H.
• Set k = bP−|H|·pmax
pmax
c.
• Set xi = pi + pmax for all i ≤ |H|+ k.
• Set x|H|+k+1 = p|H|+k+1 + P − (|H|+ k) · pmax.
• Set xj = pj for all |H|+ k + 2 ≤ j ≤ |H|+ |M|.
4. Else set xi = pi +
P
|H∪M| for all i ∈ H ∪M.
Let pmax := maxi∈L pi and let P :=
∑
i∈L pi. Then for every best response
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 49. If L 6= ∅, then for any best response x of the row player against
strategy y it holds that ‖x− p‖∞ ≥ pmax. Else p is the best response.
Proof. Using similar arguments as in Lemma 36, it can be proven that if there
are no pure strategies i and k such that Rky − Riy − dr < 0 then any shifting
of probability decreases the utility of the row player. Thus, the best response
of the player is p. On the other hand, if there are strategies i and k such that
Rky−Riy−dr > 0, then the utility of the row player increases if all the probability
from strategy i is shifted to pure strategy k. The set L contains all these pure
strategies. Let j ∈ L be the pure strategy that defines pmax. Then, all the pmax
probability can be shifted from j to the a pure strategy in H, i.e. a pure strategy
that yields the highest payoff, and strictly increase the utility of the player. Thus,
the strategy j is played with zero probability and the claim follows.
In what follows assume that L 6= ∅, hence pmax > 0. From Lemma 49 follows
that there is a best response where the strategy with the highest payoff is played
with probability p1 + pmax. Hence, it can be shifted up to pmax probability from
pure strategies with lower payoff to each pure strategy with higher payoff, starting
from the second pure strategy etc. After this shift of probabilities there will be a
set of pure strategies that where each one is played with probability pi+pmax and
possibly one pure strategy j that is played with probability less or equal to pj.
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The question is whether more probability should be shifted from the low payoff
strategies to strategies that yield higher payoff. The next lemma establishes that
no pure strategy form L is played with positive probability in any best response
against y.
Lemma 50. In every best response against strategy y all pure strategies i ∈ L
are played with zero probability.
Proof. Let K denote the set of pure strategies that are played with positive
probability after the first shifting of probabilities. Without loss of generality
assume that each strategy i ∈ K is played with probability pi + pmax. Then the
utility of the player under this strategy is equal to U =
∑
i∈K(pi+pmax)·Riy−dr ·
pmax. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is one strategy j from L that
belongs to K. Suppose that probability δ is shifted from the strategy j to the first
pure strategy. Then the utility for the player is equal to U+δ(R1y−Rjy−dr) > U ,
since by the definition of L we have that R1y − Rjy − dr > 0. Thus, the utility
of the player is increasing if probability is shifted. Notice that the analysis holds
even if the penalty is pmax + δ instead of pmax, thus the claim follows.
Thus, all the probability P from strategies from L should be shifted to strate-
gies that yield higher payoff. The question now is what is the optimal way to
distribute that probability over the strategies with the higher payoff. It is not
hard to see that distributing this probability uniformly over the strategies in H
minimizes the penalty the player suffers. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the
maximum amount of probability is shifted to strategies in H. Next we prove that
if P ≥ pmax · (|H|+ |M|) then P is uniformly distributed over the pure strategies
in H ∪M.
Lemma 51. If P ≥ pmax · (|H| + |M|) then there is a best response where the
probability P is uniformly distributed over the pure strategies in H ∪M.
Proof. Let |H|+ |M| = k and S = P − k · pmax. Let
U =
∑
i∈H∪M
(pi + pmax +
S
k
)Riy − dr(pmax + S
k
)
be the utility when the probability S is distributed uniformly over all pure strate-
gies inH∪M. Furthermore, let U ′ be the utility when δ > 0 probability is shifted
from a pure strategy j to the first pure strategy that yields the highest payoff.
Then U ′ = U + δ(R1y − Rjy − dr), but R1y − Rjy − dr ≤ 0 since j ∈ H ∪M.
The claim follows.
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Approximation Algorithm
Using the previous analysis the correctness of the algorithm follows.
Note that, using similar arguments as in Lemma 36 the next lemma can be
proved.
Lemma 52. If dr ≥ 1, then p is a dominant strategy.
Furthermore, the combination of Lemma 52 with the fact that best responses
can be computed in polynomial time gives the next theorem.
Theorem 20. In biased games with L∞ penalty functions and max{dr, dc} ≥ 1,
an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Again, we can see that there is a connection between the equilibria of the
distance biased game and the well supported Nash equilibria (WSNE) of the
underlying bimatrix game. The following Theorem can be proven in a similar
way as the Theorem 16.
Lemma 53. Let B = (R,C, br(x,p), bc(y,q), dr, dc) be a distance biased game
with L∞ penalties and let d := max{dr, dc}. Any equilirbium of B is a d-WSNE
for the bimatrix game (R,C).
Approximation Algorithm
For the quality of approximation, we can reuse the results that we proved for
the L1 penalty. Lemma 37 applies unchanged. For Lemma 38, we observe that
dc · bc(y∗,q) ≤ 1 when the penalty bc(y∗,q) is the L∞ norm, since for this case it
holds ‖y∗ − q‖∞ ≤ 1 and it is assumed that dc ≤ 1. Thus, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 21. In biased games with L∞ penalties a 2/3-equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
6.6.5 Proof that y∗
T
y∗ − 2y∗kqk ≤ 1− 2qk.
Proof. Notice from the Equation (6.7) that for all i we get yi = yk +
1
2
(αi − αk).
Using that, we can write the term yTy =
∑
i y
2
i as follows for a strategy y with
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support size s.
s∑
i=1
y2i = y
2
i +
∑
i 6=k
y2i
= y2k +
∑
i 6=k
(
yk +
1
2
(αi − αk)
)2
= sy2k +
(∑
i 6=k
(αi − αk)
)
yk +
1
4
∑
i 6=k
(αk − αi)2.
Then, we can see that y∗
T
y − 2y∗Tk qk is increasing as y∗k increases, since we
know from Lemma 43 that y∗k > 0. This becomes clear if we take the partial
derivative of y∗
T
y∗ − 2y∗kqk with respect to y∗k which is equal to
2sy∗k +
∑
i 6=k
(αi − αk)− 2qk = 2sy∗k +
∑
i 6=k
2(y∗i − y∗k)− 2qk
(
since yi = yk +
1
2
(αi − αk)
)
= 2sy∗k + 2
∑
i 6=k
y∗i − 2(s− 1)y∗k − 2qk
= 2
s∑
i=1
y∗i − 2qk
= 2− 2qk
≥ 0 (since y∗k > 0).
Thus, the value of y∗
T
y∗ − 2y∗kqk is maximized when y∗k = 1 and our claim
follows.
6.7 Open Questions
Several open questions stem from this chapter. The most important one is to
understand the exact computational complexity of equilibrium computation in
Lipschitz and penalty games. Another interesting feature is that we cannot verify
efficiently in all penalty games whether a given strategy profile is an equilibrium,
and so it seems questionable whether PPAD can capture the full complexity of
penalty games. On the other side, for the distance biased games that we studied
in this chapter, we have shown that we can decide in polynomial time if a strategy
profile is an equilibrium. Is the equilibrium computation problem PPAD-complete
for the classes of games we studied? Are there any subclasses of penalty games,
e.g. when the underlying normal form game is zero sum, that are easy to solve?
Another obvious direction is to derive better polynomial time approximation
guarantees for distance biased games. We believe that the optimization approach
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used by [66] and [24] might tackle this problem. Under the L1 penalties the
analysis of the steepest descent algorithm may be similar to [24] and therefore
we may be able to obtain a constant approximation guarantee similar to the
bound of 0.5 that was established in Chapter 4. The other known techniques
that compute approximate Nash equilibria [7] and approximate well supported
Nash equilibria [15, 30, 53] solve a zero sum bimatrix game in order to derive the
approximate equilibrium, and there is no obvious way to generalise this approach
in penalty games.
104
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis we studied algorithms for computing approximate equilibria in sev-
eral classes of games.
In Chapter 3 we have developed a new technique for computing approximate
Nash equilibria, and approximate well-supported Nash equilibria. This new tech-
nique has allowed us to improve upon the best known results in multiple settings.
For well-supported Nash equilibria, we have presented a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE, and we have shown how to implement it in a
communication efficient manner, and a query efficient manner, improving upon
the best known results in those settings. For approximate Nash equilibria, our
techniques obtain a 0.382-NE and, again, we showed how this can be carried out
in a communication efficient manner, improving the best known results in that
setting. Several open questions stem from our paper. The most obvious one is
to improve the derived bounds. Another important question is to derive lower
bounds for all the problems studied in this chapter.
In Chapter 4 we presented a polynomial time algorithm that, for every δ in the
range 0 < δ ≤ 0.5, finds a (0.5+δ)-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game in time
polynomial in the input size and 1
δ
. Note that our approximation guarantee does
not depend on the number of players, which is a property that was not previously
known to be achievable for polymatrix games, and still cannot be achieved for
general strategic form games. As it was explained at the end of this Chapter,
there are several interesting open questions. Among the most interesting ones,
given the result of [63], is to derive a lower bound on the approximability of the
computation of approximate equilibria in polymatrix games.
In Chapter 6 we studied games with infinite action spaces, and non-linear pay-
off functions. We have shown that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function can
be exploited to provide approximation algorithms. For Lipschitz games, Lipschitz
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continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide an efficient algorithm for
finding approximate equilibria. For penalty games, Lipschitz continuity of the
penalty function allows us to provide a QPTAS. Finally, we provided strongly
polynomial algorithms for computing approximate equilibria for L1, L
2
2, and L∞
distance biased games. Among all the open questions described in the end of
the Chapter, maybe the most interesting question is to pin down exactly the
computational complexity of these games.
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